Assertion Games to Justify Classical Reasoning by Zahn, Peter
Assertion Games
to Justify Classical Reasoning
Simplified and expanded version of [20]
Peter Zahn
Abstract. To establish and justify general methods of linguistic reasoning, we introduce a use
of sentences by means of ‘assertion rules’ which partially have a narrow relationship to the
proceeding in [7: 1., 2.] and help us to demonstrate that one can rely on certain logical inference
rules (§1, §2). As assertion rules we choose only such rules which can be formulated with words
which are as unambiguous as possible. Therefore, we at first introduce the particles ∧,∨,∃, and
¬ only. Let the resulting use of sentences be said to be the ‘primary’ use. However, we cannot
define a subjunction (material implication) which indicates that, according to this use, one may
conclude the succedent from the antecedent.
Therefore, we subsequently liberalize the primary use of sentences in §3. This liberalization
establishes a ‘classical’ use which permits to apply classical logic, and can be justified by the
following (and some other) facts: An elementary sentence may be asserted classically iff (i.e.
if and only if) it may be asserted primarily. A sentence of the form ∀x [A(x) → B(x)] (which
is defined suitably) expresses that, for any value r of the variable x, if A(r) may be asserted
classically, then B(r) may at once (and generally later on) be asserted so. For this ‘inferential
purpose’, the classical use of sentences of that form is also not unnecessarily restricted. If we
replace the primary use by the classical use, only dispensable means of speech get lost. (Details
will be discussed in §6.)
In §4 we especially deal with the concept of infinity on the example of the set IN of natural
numbers. The infinity of IN is considered as a ‘deontic’ one. This means that we shall never be
obliged to terminate the construction of natural numbers. So we avoid the ontological assumption
concerning the infinity of IN.
In §5 we investigate a use of sentences which include indicators (as “this ant”, e.g.) or objectual
variables. This use depends on situations. To eliminate this dependency we introduce objectual
quantification.
In §7 - §10 we deal with a ramified type theory in a cumulative version: In §7 and §8 we
introduce an extension of a union of higher order languages by means of variables x, y, . . . for
constants of arbitrary order, and variables for tuples (c1, . . . , cj) of arbitrary order and arbitrary
length j ∈ IN+. So we may simply identify types with orders. In that language, ‘type-free’
equations x = y are definable. We extend the primary and the classical use to that language,
show that their sentences are non-circular, and that their formulas are invariant under (=).
In §9 we deal with singular description terms.
In §10 we even introduce higher order languages which also contain formulas with indicators
and objectual variables, and enable a quantification which combines both substitutional and
objectual quantification. We show that we may commute any consecutive existential quantifiers
that occur in formulas of those expanded languages.
In §11 we extend the language introduced before by proper names for parts of that language
such that we can speak in that language about itself.
By this means, we progressively introduce a (not completely) universal frame of language.
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§0. Introduction
By an assertion we understand an act: One asserts a proposition in general simply by
pronouncing it as a complete sentence to a listener or writing it for a reader. Statements
we also include among assertions. However, there exist linguistic acts in the shape of
assertions which are not to be understood as assertions or are not meant seriously. (Ex-
amples are fictitious, fictional or jocular expressions.) This can be said additionally or
can result from the context. Nevertheless, we can in general decide whether one has - or
ourselves have - asserted a particular sentence because assertions which are unjustified
(as lies, e.g.) or have not been accepted or believed are assertions as well (or are said to
be assertions here).
Let us raise the question how it is possible to understand assertions. To this we consider
the sentence: “Paul had a temperature of 39.2◦ C yesterday evening.” A listener can
understand this in so far as he is used to the rule by which this sentence should be
asserted only after measuring temperature and getting the corresponding result. Such
examples lead us to the
Thesis: Sentences become understandable because it is usual or agreed to restrict
assertions in a regular way, and so to omit asserting particular sentences finally or tem-
porarily. (This explanation requires, of course, some completion.)
The underlying standards of assertion are generally only tacitly valid. To obtain means
of linguistic reasoning (especially inference rules) which can be shown to be serviceable
and reliable we shall contrive a use of sentences by fixing explicit ‘assertion rules’ in
addition to certain conventional standards. However, we do not intend to describe or
explain how fluent speakers argue factually. Instead, we intend to establish and justify
an argumentation technique which is efficient, uncomplicated, clearly arranged, and easy
to use.
As assertion rules we shall choose only such rules that can be formulated with words
which are as unambiguous as possible - so that we can check in as many cases as possible
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whether we have broken such a rule. However, it would not be sufficient for the mentioned
purpose to take only ‘formal’ rules like such of a calculus since it follows from a result
of GÖDEL that there does not exist a calculus, K, such that any first order arithmetic
sentence is assertible iff it is deducible by the rules of K.
Recourse to prohibition rules: Which kind of rules are particularly appropriate
to stipulate a use of assertions? General positive commands of the form “Whenever a
happens, then do b !” have the disadvantage that one mostly has no opportunity to
act upon them. An example for this fact is given by the following rule: “Whenever two
sentences A, B have been asserted, then assert A∧B too”. Since we would have to speak
without end by this rule, it suggests itself to replace it by an analogous permission. That
an act is permitted means that it is not forbidden or that it must not be forbidden. To
forbid an act means to ask or demand, not to do it. Note that the meaning of prohibitions
can be demonstrated by means of punishment or blame, for instance. Therefore and with
regard to the above mentioned thesis we shall take prohibition rules as assertion rules.
A calculus, e.g., is a system K of rules that allow to successively perform certain schematic
operations on strings of symbols. This means, however, that in the context ofK such an operation
is forbidden unless it is explicitly permitted by the rules of K.
Material inference rules and means for their formulations: Requisite for re-
asoning are inference rules by which, for particular formulas A1(x), A2(x), and B(x),
e.g., we may conclude B(r) from A1(r) and A2(r), for any value r of the variable x. To
indicate that one may conclude so we intend to write
∀x [A1(x) ∧A2(x)→ B(x)]
(cf. [12, p.104]). To this end the assertion of this sentence should be restricted to the
condition that, for all values r of x, if A1(r) and A2(r) may be asserted, then B(r) may
be asserted at once. But our understanding of this condition is particularly problematic,
because it contains the words “for all” and “if - then”. So we shall define sentences of the
forms A→ B and ∀xA(x) by means of ∧ (and), ¬ (not), and ∃ (for some). However, those
sentences will serve their ‘inferential purposes’ only after a subsequent liberalization (§3)
of the initially introduced use of that language.
Remarks on some well-known approaches to logic.
(1) An intuitionistic approach starts from a concept of proof which can inductively
be defined (cf. [1], [4]). We formulate that for subjunction only:
A proof of A → B is a ‘construction’ c that converts each proof of A into a
proof of B.
That c is a proof of A → B means in detail that, for all pertinent p, if p is a proof of
A, then c(p) is a proof of B. Especially for 0 = 1 in place of B, this means that there
does not exist a proof of A. In these explanations, however, we have already used the
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words “for all”, “if - then”, and “not” of everyday speech. Besides, (for compound A) it
is in general not decidable whether a pertinent construction p is a proof of A. For this
reason, in [5] c as above has been replaced by a pair (c, d) where d is a ‘demonstration’
which shows that c converts each proof of A into a proof of B. However, this concept of
proof - which is critically discussed in [1, p. 232] and [14] - is rather intricate and yet
somewhat problematic. - The following approach avoids definitions which are circular or
seriously involved in an infinite regressus:
(2) An approach to logic by dialogues (see [9, pp. 60ff.]). Let us consider material
dialogue games as in [9, pp. 75 - 83]. To show their suitability we need especially the
following theorem by which the ‘modus ponens’ may be applied: If there exist strategies
to win dialogues for A as well as for A → B, then there also exists a strategy to win
dialogues for B. This theorem is a composite proposition of a metalanguage. Even the
attempt to dialogically interprete it meets with difficulties. Moreover, to formulate a
proof of that theorem - or of a more general so called Cut Theorem - we need sentences
of the metalanguage in which the connective “if - then” and the quantifier “for all” occur
iteratively. (Note also that the mentioned strategies are meant to be strategies to win
dialogues against any opponents.) In the proof of the Cut Theorem, the comprehension
of those particles succeed by linguistic habits and on the context. However, some ways of
reasoning applied in that proof are just to be justified for the object language by means
of the Cut Theorem.
In [6], K. LORENZ has taken other frame rules for dialogues as a basis, and has used
constructive ordinal numbers. For the pertinent investigations one must have seen before
that those alleged ordinals can in fact be used as ordinals, i.e. enable transfinite induction.
- In Proof Theory (cf. [13] or [16], e.g.) occur analogous problems.
The problem of beginning
As we have partially seen, the considered approaches to logic are involved in different
kinds of circularity or regressus. However, there is a more general problem: How can one
be initially entitled to any reasoning at all (cf. [2], [15])? For a justification of rules for
arguing, or for a proof that they are reliable we already need reliable argumentations.
To reduce this problem, we do not only stipulate certain rules to restrict assertions;
we also agree that those assertions must not be restricted by further rules. Then we
can see that the stipulated rules for compound sentences may be ‘inverted’ (cf. the
‘Inversionsprinzip’ in [7, §4]). So the latter rules and their inverses may also be used as
inference rules. - Since our colloquial language can partially be understood to be ruled in
that way, we may also perform particular colloquial reasonings by applying the mentioned
rules. (Later we shall see that also certain other rules may be applied.)
If we start any metatheoretical reasoning with sentences which are said to be assumed,
presupposed, or the like, we shall treat them like asserted sentences - so that the con-
clusions which we draw from them may be asserted as soon as those assumptions have
rightly been asserted. In this way we understand colloquial conditionals.
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We shall not presuppose that there (‘actually’ or ‘potentially’) exist infinitely many
objects like (mental or other) constructions, proofs, or numbers, for instance.
§1. An assertion game
Elementary sentences and their use
We presuppose that we already dispose of concepts of certain ‘elementary sentences’,
of ‘internal rules’ (of assertion concerning elementary sentences), and of ‘external
rules’. (Here we include usage among rules.) For our purposes it suffices to formulate
some claims on these concepts and some explanations.
Let elementary (or ‘atomic’) sentences be not as usual composed of other formulas
(i.e. sentences or sentence forms) by means of connectives, quantifiers, or set theoretical
particles. - In the following we write E,E1, . . . for elementary sentences.
For numerous elementary sentences, E, we have learned in practice that E may be
asserted only after we have made a particular perception or observation or have got a
special result of an act as a measuring, for instance. (Details are beyond the scope of our
topic). Let at least such rules of assertion (which are valid in our community) be said to
be external. We say that E has been anchored to mean that the present assertion of
E would not violate an external rule.
Several elementary sentences can also depend on each other by rules concerning asser-
tions of those sentences. Examples are the following rules by which one may assert “(All)
beetles are insects” and “Beetles are no flies”: If the sentence “This is a beetle” may be
asserted, then also the sentence “This is an insect” may be asserted, but “This is a fly”
must not be asserted. (See also the ‘Prädikatorenregeln’ in [9, p. 182].) Thus sentences as
“Beetles are insects” and “Beetles are no flies” are based on our common linguistic usage
(see [3]). [Here we need not deal with the question whether they can also be justified by
(fictitious) definitions as “beetle 
 insect and winged and with wing-cases and ...”.]
Rules which are valid in our community and by which elementary sentences depend on
each other as in the above examples can be considered as particular internal rules. As
an internal rule we also take the prohibition to assert a particular elementary sentence,
⊥. Let us say that E has been rejected to mean that the present or later assertion of
E would (generally together with already accomplished assertions of other elementary
sentences, D1, . . . , Dn) violate an internal rule. However, if Di has been rejected at the
moment t, let any assertion ofDi at t or later pass for failed, i.e. not performed. Therefore,
if E has been asserted (without failing), E cannot become rejected thereafter.
As internal rules for elementary sentences we at first admit - apart from the mentioned
prohibition to assert ⊥ - only rules with instances (substitution instances) by which, for
certain elementary sentences E1, . . . , En, and E, it is forbidden to do both, to assert all
of the sentences E1, . . . , En and to reject E. For such an instance of an internal rule we
simply write
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(Int) E1, . . . , En ⇒ E.
Commentary: From (Int) the following results:
If E1, . . . , En have been asserted, it is forbidden to reject E.
But if E has been rejected, it is forbidden to assert all of the sentences E1, . . . , En.
If, moreover, E2, . . . , En have been asserted, then E1 is rejected.
In §5 we shall also admit other similar internal rules for elementary sentences.
Example 1: Let a and b range over signs for length (as ‘25 cm’, e.g.). Let L(s, a) mean
that a stick s has the length a, and suppose that we have the internal rules
a = b, a 6= b ⇒ ⊥
L(s, a), L(s, b) ⇒ a = b.
⊥ is agreed to be rejected. So if we assert a 6= b, then a = b becomes rejected. So if we
also assert L(s, a), then L(s, b) becomes rejected.
By the latter rule, we may assert only one result of a measurement of s. This is not suitable
for a branch s which can grow or for a stick which can change its length otherwise. In this case,
a formulation as “s has the length a at t” (where t denotes a moment) may be more adequate.
Nevertheless, in certain cases only experience can show (in general without giving final certainty,
however) whether or how far a particular linguistic rule can be useful.
Now we consider the internal rules of the form (Int) as a calculus which operates on
elementary sentences where ‘⇒’ indicates the permitted deduction steps. Let us agree
that if E is deducible by those rules from other elementary sentences which have already
been anchored and asserted, then also E passes for anchored. (Let this agreement be
external.)
Notes: 1. An instance ⇒ E of an internal rule without premises can be inconsistent
with other internal rules. In this case it should not be accepted.
2. It is not totally impossible that an elementary sentence becomes both, anchored and
rejected. (Therefore we do not use the word “verified” for “anchored”.)
3. If E1, . . . , En have been asserted from separate persons at the same moment and if the
internal rules have been violated by those assertions, then let them pass for failed.
A material first order language L0
In the following we only deal with sentences that do not depend by rules of assertion
(i.e. exclusive of rules of politeness or regard, e.g) on particular linguistic contexts or
situations (or on the involved persons, e.g.). In §5, however, we shall also deal with other
sentences as “This is a beetle” that may only be asserted in particular situations (as
while showing a particular animal).
At first we only consider formulas that are elementary formulas (of a certain class) or
are composed of them by means of ∧ (and), ∨ (or), ¬ (not), and ∃ (for some) as usual.
6
Let the class of those formulas be denoted by L0. We assume here that the concepts of
variables (of L0) and of values of variables have already been introduced. Those values
are supposed to be constants, i.e. certain strings of symbols in which no variables occur.
For short we say
“formula” for “formula of L0”,
“sentence” for “sentence of L0”.
(Sentences are formulas in which all occurrences of variables are bound.)
In more detail, we presuppose the following: For any string x of symbols we know how to
decide whether x is a variable. For any variable x and any string c of symbols we know how to
decide whether c is a value of x. Any two occurrences of variables in any string of symbols do
not overlap. - Elementary formulas are not as usual composed of other formulas by means of
logical or set theoretical particles. Elementary formulas include outer brackets (which, however,
we generally omit). Further brackets occur only pairwise as usual in elementary formulas. From
an elementary formula there results an elementary sentence if we replace the occurring variables
by arbitrary values of them.
If F is a formula and x1, . . . , xn (n ≥ 1) are distinct variables, then let also
∃x1, . . . , xn F
be a formula (in which x1, . . . , xn occur bound). - As ‘metavariables’ we use
F, G, H for formulas
A, B, C for sentences
x, y, z for variables
x for lists x1, . . . , xn of distinct variables
r for lists r1, . . . , rm of constants
Ax or A(x) for formulas in which at most the variables x occur free.
Definition: r is a value of x iff r has as many members as x (i.e. m = n) and ri
is a value of xi for i = 1, . . . , n. In this case, by Ar we denote the sentence which is
obtained from a given formula Ax by substituting r for x, i.e. ri for each free occurrence
of xi (i = 1, . . . , n). - We write
\A for: to assert A.
Now, (Int) can also more detailed be written as: \E1, . . . , \ En ⇒ \E .
Though we have partially formalized the considered language L0 by using symbols as logical
particles, L0 is a material (assertoric) language, not merely a formal language. Since we shall
introduce a use of sentences such that some but not all sentences may be asserted, we need not
additionally give interpretations which assign meanings to sentences (in a realistic, mentalistic,
or other manner). Nevertheless, some relation to ‘reality’ is given by external rules. - In §4, §5,
and §7 - §11 we shall also consider some expansions of L0.
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The primary game
Leading idea: We should generally assert a sentence only if we know arguments for it, which we
could, therefore, also assert to ourselves in our mind before asserting that sentence. Accordingly,
we choose rules of assertion by which an assertion is forbidden until a certain condition is satisfied.
Thus, that a sentence may be asserted means that its assertion would no longer violate an
appertaining rule.
Given certain external rules as well as internal rules for elementary sentences (as above),
the primary game is defined to be the ‘assertion game’ with those rules and the below
quoted assertion rules for compound sentences. Also these rules, which are conditional,
possibly temporary prohibitions of assertions, are said to be internal. The first of them
is to be read as: Assert (A∧B) only after A has been asserted and B has been asserted.
(Accordingly, let “:⇒ ” be short for “only after”.)
P(∧) \ (A ∧B) :⇒ \A and \B
P(∨) \ (A ∨B) :⇒ \A or \B (or both)
P(∃) \∃xAx :⇒ for some value r of x : \Ar
P(¬) \¬A :⇒ A has been rejected,
where the latter condition means that, by the internal rules, A must not (or no longer)
be asserted. (This does in general require that certain elementary sentences have been
asserted. - A more detailed explanation of “rejected” will be given below.)
Let this game not contain other rules of assertion. - The rule P(∧) can also be substitu-
ted by two rules. The internal rules are formulated by means of our colloquial language,
which we have learned exemplarily. This is not problematic for the rules P(∧), P(∨),
and P(∃) since we know how to decide at any time, and for any sentence of the form
A ∧ B, A ∨ B, or ∃xAx, whether (we know that) the present assertion of it would not
violate the pertinent assertion rule. (This is a reason for which we have chosen those
rules.) - To explain P(¬) we at first give some examples:
Example 2: For sentencesA andB which have been asserted according to the assertion
rules, and for any sentence C we may successively also assert A ∧ B, and (A ∧ B) ∨ C
since this would not violate the corresponding assertion rules. Therefore, ¬ [(A∧B)∨C]
must not be asserted.
Example 3: ∃x (Ax∧¬Ax) is rejected, since before asserting this sentence we should
have asserted Ar ∧ ¬Ar for some value r of x, and hence also Ar as well as ¬Ar, for
which, however, Ar should also have been rejected. Accordingly, ¬∃x (Ax ∧ ¬Ax) may
be asserted.
Example 4: Let s denote a stick with a length of approximately 25 cm, and let E now
be short for “s is 24.8 cm in length”, which can only be anchored by a measurement of s
with the result 24.8 cm. Suppose that E can be rejected only by asserting another result
of a measurement of s. Let us assume, however, that s has been burnt before measuring.
Then E can neither be anchored nor rejected. So we must not assert E, neither ¬E.
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This example shows that if E is an elementary sentence, the assertion of ¬E does in
general not become permitted by a mere hindrance to anchor E.
By the rule P(¬), the assertability of ¬A is restricted to the condition that A is
rejected, which means that performing any series of assertions which ends with that of A
and satisfies P(∧), P(∨), and P(∃) would (generally together with already accomplished
assertions of elementary sentences) violate another internal rule. If we speak so about
any assertion series of such a kind we do not only mean assertion series which will
really individually be performed, imagined, or considered. We ignore want of time and
opportunity to perform, imagine, or consider assertions.
However, the condition that a sentence A is rejected is not in any case decidable. This fact
corresponds to a theorem of GÖDEL by which there does not exist an effective procedure by
which one can, for any first order arithmetical sentence A, decide whether A may be asserted.
(This theorem is also relevant to other approaches to logic.)
As in the above Examples 2 and 3, the assertion rules for compound sentences can
be inverted for the following reasons: The primary game does not contain other rules
to restrict assertions of those sentences, and the use of every compound sentence is
determined non-circularly since it only depends on the use of its predecessors in the
following sense.
Definition: C is said to be a predecessor of D iff C can be deduced from D by at
least one application of the following rules (where ‘⇒’ indicates the deduction steps):
A ∧B ⇒ A; A ∧B ⇒ B;
A ∨B ⇒ A; A ∨B ⇒ B;
¬A ⇒ A; ∃xAx ⇒ Ar (for values r of x).
(Thus, A and B are the ‘immediate predecessors’ of A ∧B and of A ∨B, etc.)
The mentioned non-circularity means that no sentence is a predecessor of itself. Though
this proposition belongs to a metalanguage, it can be understood as in the primary game.
Sentences of L0 or of a similar metalanguage which have a sufficiently small complexity
are obviously non-circular. Moreover, as generally known, the noncircularity of all sen-
tences of L0 can be proved by induction on their complexity. However, we have not yet
established that method of proof. So we stipulate for the present that by a sentence is
to be understood a non-circular sentence only. - Now we consider the following ‘inverse
rules’ (of internal rules):
I(∧) A,B ⇒ A ∧B
I(∨) A ⇒ A ∨B
B ⇒ A ∨B
I(∃) Ar ⇒ ∃xAx (for values r of x).
These rules have the following property: After asserting the premises (on the left) of an
instance of an inverse rule the assertion of its conclusion (on the right) would not violate
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the pertinent rule. According to this property, in certain cases we may successively assert
several sentences in a proper order.
This shows a narrow relationship of our introduction of compound sentences to that given in
[7] (see specially [7, §4, §7]) which starts with rules as I(∧), I(∨), and I(∃) as permission rules.
The latter approach seems to have the advantage that colloquial phrases as “or” and “for some”
do not occur in its rules. However, it must be supplied by the analogous agreement that one may
assert a sentence (which is neither elementary nor a negation) only if there exists a deduction of
it from asserted elementary sentences or negations by the indicated rules.
Also the rule P (¬) can be inverted: If A has been rejected, then ¬A may be asserted
(cf. Example 3).
However, the following example shows that a rule to restrict assertions can generally be inverted
for non-circular sentences only: Suppose, e.g., that an extension of the language L0 contains a
particular sentence A0 (as {x : x /∈ x} ∈ {x : x /∈ x}, e.g.) whose assertion is restricted by the
rule: \A0 :⇒ \¬A0. Then this rule cannot be inverted. Note that A0 is a predecessor of itself.
A corresponding assertion rule for universal sentences would be the following:
\∀xAx :⇒ for all values r of x : \Ar.
This would not be useful if x has infinitely many values. So we define instead
∀xF 
 ¬∃x¬F.
Moreover, we define ‘subjunction’ by
F → G 
 ¬ (F ∧ ¬G).
However, a sentence ∀x (Ax → Bx) defined so does in general not yet express that, for
any value r of x, one may conclude Br from Ar (cf. §0). To this end we shall liberalize
the primary game in §3. We shall also return to this point in §6.
§2. Admissibility of inference rules
Now we deal with further rules which may be applied. For the present, we restrict our
investigations to inference rules of the form
R : A1, . . . ,An ⇒ ¬B
with sentence schemes Ai and B in which metavariables (for sentences, formulas, varia-
bles, constants, or proper terms) may occur - and from which sentences are obtained
by replacing those metavariables by arbitrary values of them. We say that an instance
(substitution instance) of R results from R by such a substitution.
We define a condition on which R may be ‘applied’ (as we shall show):
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Definition: R is said to be admissible iff, by the internal rules, it is forbidden for
any instance A1, . . . , An ⇒ ¬B of R to assert all of the sentences A1, . . . , An, and B. -
This condition belongs to a metalanguage and can be formalized by
¬∃ .. (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An ∧ B)
where ‘..’ indicates a list of all metavariables occurring behind.
The just mentioned metalanguage is an expansion of the object language L. We have just used
abbreviations as
A1 ∧ A2 ∧ B 
 (A1 ∧ A2) ∧ B.
Only for rules of the special form R with a negation on the right we could define the concept of
admissibility in terms of the introduced particles ∧,¬, and ∃. But in §3 we shall define a concept
of ‘classical admissibility’ for rules of the general form A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B.
By the following Lemma admissible rules of the form R may be applied. To formulate
it, we use the explication: That A has been asserted without violating any internal rule
means that there has been performed a series of assertions which ends with that of A,
begins only with assertion of elementary sentences that have not been rejected or with
assertions of negations of sentences that have been rejected (or with assertions of both
sorts), and then only applies the inverse rules (see Example 2).
2.1 Basic Lemma: If A1, . . . , An ⇒ ¬B is an instance of an admissible rule and
A1, . . . , An have been asserted without violating an internal rule, then B has been rejected
(so that ¬B may be asserted at once).
Proof: Let A1, A2 ⇒ ¬B (e.g.) be an instance of an admissible rule A1,A2 ⇒ ¬B. So
∃ .. (A1∧A2∧B) has been rejected. Assume, that A1 and A2 have been asserted without
violating an internal rule. Then any assertion series ending with the assertion \B may
- by the inverse rules - be proceeded with the assertions of A1 ∧ A2, A1 ∧ A2 ∧ B, and
∃ .. (A1 ∧A2 ∧B) which, however, has been rejected. So any assertion series ending with
\B violates an internal rule, i.e. B is rejected. 
Definition: For formulas F in which the distinct variables x1, . . . , xn but no others
occur free,
∃.F 
 ∃x1, . . . , xn F,
specially ∃.A 
 A, for sentences A (i.e. n = 0).
Proposition: The following inference rules are admissible:
R01 A, ¬ (A ∧B) ⇒ ¬B
B, ¬ (A ∧B) ⇒ ¬A
R02 ¬ (A ∨B) ⇒ ¬A
¬ (A ∨B) ⇒ ¬B
R03 ¬∃xAx ⇒ ¬Ar (for values r of x)
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R1 ⇒ ¬∃.(F ∧ ¬F )
R2 ⇒ ¬∃.[(F ∧G) ∧ ¬ (G ∧ F )]
R3a ⇒ ¬∃.{[(F ∧G) ∧H] ∧ ¬ [F ∧ (G ∧H)]}
R3b ⇒ ¬∃.{[F ∧ (G ∧H)] ∧ ¬ [(F ∧G) ∧H]}
R4 ¬∃.G ⇒ ¬∃.(F ∧G)
R5 ¬∃.(F ∧G), ¬∃.(F ∧ ¬G) ⇒ ¬∃.F
R6a ⇒ ¬∃.[F ∧ ¬ (F ∨G)]
R6b ⇒ ¬∃.[G ∧ ¬ (F ∨G)]
R7 ⇒ ¬∃.[¬F ∧ ¬G ∧ (F ∨G)].
These rules have the form R : A1, . . . ,An ⇒ ¬B from above. To show that such a rule is
admissible, we at first note the sentence schemes
B,A1, . . . ,An
with „a.“ for „assumptions” behind. Thereafter we tread them like sentences and show
that their assertions would together violate an internal rule: To this end we infer from
those assumptions further sentences by applying P(∧), P(∨), P(∃), their inverses or rules
that have already been shown to be admissible (cf. 2.1). We proceed so until we obtain a
contradiction C,¬C. According to the internal rules, we ought to assert those assumptions
only if all sentences inferred from them - inclusive of C,¬C - may also be asserted, which,
however, is not the case. - Substitutions of all variables occurring free in the considered
formulas by values of them will sometimes be indicated by *.
Ad R01:
B,A,¬ (A ∧B) a.
A ∧B I(∧).
Ad R03:
Ar, ¬∃xAx a.
∃xAx I(∃).
Ad R02: Analogously. - Ad R1: See §1, Example 3.
Ad R2:
∃.[(F ∧G) ∧ ¬ (G ∧ F )] a.
for some * : (F ∗ ∧G∗) ∧ ¬ (G∗ ∧ F ∗) P(∃)
F ∗ ∧G∗, ¬ (G∗ ∧ F ∗) P(∧)
F ∗, G∗ P(∧)
G∗ ∧ F ∗ I(∧).
Ad R3: Analogously by means of the partial scheme:
(F ∗ ∧G∗) ∧H∗
F ∗ ∧G∗, H∗
F ∗, G∗
G∗ ∧H∗
F ∗ ∧ (G∗ ∧H∗).
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Ad R4:
∃.(F ∧G),¬∃.G a.
for some * : F ∗ ∧G∗, G∗,∃.G P(∃),P(∧), I(∃).
Ad R5:
∃.F, ¬∃.(F ∧G), ¬∃.(F ∧ ¬G) a.
for some * : F ∗, ¬ (F ∗ ∧G∗), ¬ (F ∗ ∧ ¬G∗) P(∃),R03
¬G∗ ¬¬G∗ R01.
R6 can immediately be checked.
Ad R7:
∃.[(¬F ∧ ¬G) ∧ (F ∨G)] a.
for some * : (¬F ∗ ∧ ¬G∗) ∧ (F ∗ ∨G∗) P(∃)
¬F ∗ ∧ ¬G∗, F ∗ ∨G∗ P(∧)
¬F ∗, ¬G∗, F ∗ | G∗ P(∧), P(∨).
At last F ∗ ∨ G∗ has to be ‘defended’ by one of the sentences F ∗, G∗; in both cases we
obtain a contradiction. 
By a term t we understand a string of symbols in which variables may occur and from
which a constant results by any substitution of all free occurring variables by values of
them. - The literal equality of any two strings of symbols % and σ will be indicated by
‘% ≡ σ’.
Definition: For lists x ≡ x1, . . . , xn (n ≥ 0) of distinct variables and lists
t ≡ t1, . . . , tn of terms, let
F
x
t result from F
by substituting ti for each free occurrence of xi (i = 1, . . . , n). - Moreover, we use the
following sentences of a metalanguage:
N(x, F ) 
 x does not occur free in F.
Fr(t, x, F ) 
 t is free for x in F, this means
1) every substitution instance of t is a value of x,
2) F xt is a formula of L0, and
3) each free occurrence of a variable in t is also free in F xt wherever t is substituted for
x in F .
Example: y is not free for x in ∃y (x < y) since y occurs free in y but the occurrence
of y substituted for x is bound in ∃y (y < y).
Remark: Fr(t, x, F ) is an abbreviation of a composite formula of a metalanguage. We
use it in the same way as a composite formula of our object language L0 in the primary
game. [In that metalanguage we may also apply 3.2 (below).]
2.2 Lemma: If Fr(t, x, F ), if x, y is a list of all distinct variables occurring free in F
or t, and if r, s is a value of x, y, then
(∗) (F xt )
x,y
r,s ≡ (F ys )xt∗ for t∗ ≡ t
x,y
r,s .
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Proof: Consider the following diagrams of partially simultaneous and partially succes-
sive substitutions of the free occurrences of x, y:
x, y x, y
t, y x, s
t∗, s t∗, s.
Proposition: The following rules are admissible:
R8 Fr(t, x, F ) ⇒ ¬∃.(F xt ∧ ¬∃xF ).
R9 N(x, F ), ¬∃.(F ∧G) ⇒ ¬∃.(F ∧ ∃xG).
Proofs: Ad R8: Let Fr(t, x, F ). By using the denotations from above we may argue
thus:
∃.(F xt ∧ ¬∃xF ) a.
for some r, s : (F xt ∧ ¬∃xF )
x,y
r,s P(∃)
(F
y
s )xt∗, ¬∃xF
y
s P(∧), (∗)
∃xF ys I(∃).
Ad R9: Let N(x, F ), and let y be a list of all distinct variables occurring free in F ∧∃xG.
Then wen may argue thus:
∃y (F ∧ ∃xG), ¬∃x, y (F ∧G) a.
for some r, s : F
y
s , G
x,y
r,s P(∃),P(∧)
(F ∧G)x,yr,s I(∧)
∃x, y(F ∧G). I(∃).
On occasion we write ‘⇔’ to combine two inference rules, and we use the definition
∀.F 
 ¬∃.¬F, specially ∀.A 
 ¬¬A.
Proposition: Admissible are the following rules:
R10a ¬∃.G, ¬∃.(F ∧ ¬G) ⇒ ¬∃.F
R10b ¬∃.¬G, ¬∃.(F ∧G) ⇒ ¬∃.F
R11 ¬∃.(G ∧ F ) ⇒ ¬∃.(F ∧G)
R12 ¬∃.[F ∧ (G ∧H)] ⇔ ¬∃.[(F ∧G) ∧H]
R13a ∀.¬F ⇔ ¬∃.F
R13b ¬¬¬A ⇔ ¬A
R13c ∀.(F → G) ⇔ ¬∃.(F ∧ ¬G)
R13d ∀.(F → ¬G) ⇔ ¬∃.(F ∧G)
For the proof that a rule A1, . . . ,An ⇒ ¬B is admissible, it also suffices to deduce ¬B
from A1, . . . ,An by repeated application of admissible rules (since ¬B contradicts the
omited assumption B). We can proceed so in the following.
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Ad R10a:
¬∃.G, ¬∃.(F ∧ ¬G) premises
¬∃.(F ∧G) by R4
¬∃.F by R5.
Ad R11:
¬∃.(G ∧ F ) prem.
¬∃.[(F ∧G) ∧ ¬ (G ∧ F )] R2
¬∃.(F ∧G) R10a.
The proof of R12 by means of R3 and R10 is left to the reader.
Ad R13a:
¬∃.¬¬F prem.
¬∃.(F ∧ ¬F ) R1
¬∃.F R10b
R13b and R13c are special cases of R13a.
Ad R13d(⇒):
∀.(F → ¬G) prem.
¬∃.(F ∧ ¬¬G) R13c
¬∃.(¬¬G ∧ F ) R11
¬∃.(G ∧ ¬¬G ∧ F ) R4, 12
¬∃.(F ∧G ∧ ¬¬G) R11, 12
¬∃.(F ∧G ∧ ¬G) R1, 4, 12
¬∃.(F ∧G) R5.
Also for further inference rules we can prove their admissibility in this way ‘deductively’.
To this end we need not yet justify the corresponding general method of deduction. This
will later be possible by means of induction on the number of deduction steps (cf. §4).
§3. An approach to classical logic
To justify classical logic in §6 we need the following result concerning the use of double
negations of elementary sentences in the primary game:
3.1 Theorem: For elementary sentences E as considered so far, if ¬¬E may be asserted,
then E may be asserted at the same time. So we ought to assert ¬¬E only after E has
been anchored (see §1).
To obtain this theorem (whose proof follows below) we assign to every elementary
sentence E the new ‘auxiliary sentence’, −E, for which we lay down these rules:
Int(−): E,−E ⇒ ⊥.
Aux(−) : Assert −E only after E has been rejected without regard to Int(−).
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Let Int(−) be an internal rule and Aux(−) an ‘auxiliary’ (not ‘internal’) rule, and let
the primary game not contain other rules concerning −E.
Note that E may be rejected due to Int(−) (i.e. by \−E) only if E has been rejected
without regard to this rule. For the proof of 3.3 we need some further preliminaries:
Definitions: A tuple (E1, . . . , En) of elementary sentences is said to be absolutely rejected
iff it is forbidden by the internal rules to assert all of its members E1, . . . , En.
(Here “absolutely” means: “independent of which other elementary sentences have been
asserted”.)
3.2 Lemma: If (E1, . . . , En) is absolutely rejected, then ⊥ is deducible from E1, . . . , En
by the internal rules.
Proof. An internal rule E1, . . . , En ⇒ E demands that if D1, . . . , Dm are elementary
sentences such that D1, . . . , Dm, E is absolutely rejected, then not to assert all of the
sentencesD1, . . . , Dm, E1, . . . , En. Therefore, all absolutely rejected tuples can be derived
by the following rules.
1. ⇒ (⊥);
2. (D1, . . . , Dm, E)⇒ (D1, . . . , Dm, E1, . . . , En)
if E1, . . . , En ⇒ E an internal rule (m,n ≥ 0);
3. (D1, . . . , Dm)⇒ (E1, . . . , En) if {D1, . . . , Dm} ⊆ {E1, . . . , En}.
So we easily obtain 3.2 by induction on the number of applications of these rules (cf. §4,
arithmetical induction). 
Proof of 3.1: We assume that ¬¬E may be asserted at present. Then ¬E has been
rejected, i.e. it has been caused that E can no more be rejected. Hence, −E has been
rejected (cf. Int(−)). Now let Γ be the list of all elementary sentences asserted to the
present. So Γ,−E is absolutely rejected. Therefore, by 3.4, ⊥ is deducible from Γ,−E
by the internal rules. But E,−E ⇒ ⊥ is the only internal rule with −E as premise. So
E must belong to or be deducible from Γ by those rules. All members of Γ ought to be
anchored. Then also E passes for anchored. 
Unsolved problems as the (arithmetical) conjecture of GOLDBACH yield examples of
sentences A for which neither A nor ¬A may be asserted up to now so that A∨¬A must
also not yet be asserted in the primary game. Correspondingly, the ‘tertium non datur’
was said to be ‘onbetrouwbaar’ by L.E.J. BROUWER (1908). Nevertheless, ¬ (A ∨ ¬A)
must not be asserted for any sentence A. This follows from the admissibility of the rules
¬ (A ∨ ¬A) ⇒ ¬A
¬ (A ∨ ¬A) ⇒ ¬¬A
(see R02). Hence, for arbitrary sentences A, we have
¬¬ (A ∨ ¬A).
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Accordingly, there exist sentences B such that ¬¬B may indeed be asserted but B must
not yet be asserted. Hence, the rule
¬¬B ⇒ B
should not be applied merely thoughtlessly. Note, however, that the inverse rule
B ⇒ ¬¬B
is admissible due to R1 and R01. - To make the previous rule admissible, too, and so to
obtain the tertium non datur and even the whole classical logic we liberalize the primary
game by using the complete asserted sentences as abbreviations of their double negations.
In §6 we shall justify this ‘classical use’ of assertions by showing that it satisfies what
has been stated in the second section of the abstract.
Definition: An inference rule A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B is said to be classically admissible iff
¬¬A1, . . . ,¬¬An ⇒ ¬¬B
is admissible.
3.3. Proposition: If an inference rule of the form
A1, . . . ,An ⇒ ¬B
(n ≥ 0) is admissible, then it is also classically admissible.
Proof for n = 2: Let A1,A2 ⇒ ¬B be admissible, i.e., let
¬∃..(A1 ∧ A2 ∧ B).
Then the following rules are also admissible:
A2,B ⇒ ¬A1 ⇒ ¬¬¬A1
and hence likewise
¬¬A1,A2 ⇒ ¬B
¬¬A1,¬¬A2 ⇒ ¬B ⇒ ¬¬¬B. 
Due to our definition ∀x F 
 ¬∃x¬F , R13b, and R03,
∀xAx⇒ Ar (for values r of x)
is classically admissible. Therefore, ∀.F may be read as “F is universally true". Accor-
dingly, a rule of the form
∀.F1, . . . ,∀.Fn ⇒ ∀.G
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will be abbreviated by
F1, . . . ,Fn ⇒ G.
Moreover, in the below rules R24 - R27 we shall (as usual) remove the ‘syntactical’
premises Fr(t, x, F ) and N(x,H) to the rear.
3.4. Proposition: The following rules are admissible (by the latter abbreviation):
R14 ⇒ F → F
R15 F, F → G ⇒ G (modus ponens)
R16 F → G, G→ H ⇒ F → H
R17a ⇒ F ∧G→ F
R17b ⇒ F ∧G→ G
R18 H → F, H → G ⇒ H → F ∧G
R19 F ∧G→ H ⇔ F → (G→ H)
R20 F ⇒ H → F
R21 F, G ⇔ F ∧G (three rules)
Definition: F ↔ G 
 (F → G) ∧ (G→ F ).
R22 ⇒ F ↔ ¬¬F
R23 F → G ⇔ ¬G→ ¬F
R24 ⇒ F xt → ∃xF, if Fr(t, x, F )
R25 F → H ⇒ ∃xF → H, if N(x,H)
R26 ⇒ ∀xF → F xt , if Fr(t, x, F )
R27 H → F ⇒ H → ∀xF, if N(x,H).
R28a ⇒ F → F ∨G
R28b ⇒ G→ F ∨G
R29 F → H, G→ H ⇒ F ∨G→ H.
Here we only prove the admissibility of R18. To this end we give a deduction of the
following rule at first:
R18* H → F ⇒ H → H ∧ F.
∀. (H → F ) premise
¬∃. (H ∧ ¬F ) R13
¬∃. (¬ (H ∧ F ) ∧H ∧ ¬F ) R4, 12
¬∃. (¬ (H ∧ F ) ∧H ∧ F ) R1, 11, 12
¬∃. (¬ (H ∧ F ) ∧H) R5
∀. (H → H ∧ F ) R11, 13.
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Ad R18 (sketch):
H → F, H → G premises
H ∧ F → G R17, 16
H → H ∧ F → H ∧ F ∧G→ F ∧G R18* etc. 
It is well-known that also other inference rules and other methods of classical reasoning
are due to the rules R1 - R29. We shall make use of this fact within the framework of L
and other languages.
§4. An approach to arithmetic
The following is due to [7, §13] or [9, II.1]. As natural numbers we can simply use the
numerals which are defined to be the figures 0, 0′, 0′′, 0′′′, . . . constructible in the calculus
K(IN) with the two rules
⇒ 0 (start with 0)
k ⇒ k′ (from k infer k′).
Here, k may be replaced by any figure already constructed in K(IN). For ‘original’ con-
stants r we read r ε IN as “r is constructible in K(IN)”. (In another context we shall
write ‘∈’ for ‘ε’.) - However, also certain ‘new’ signs may be used as abbreviations or
singular descriptions for elements of IN (e.g. 3 for 0′′′, and 357 
 3 × 102 + 5 × 10 + 7
after introducing addition etc.). - In the following, k,m, n stand for arbitrary numerals.
Let the equality on IN be the literal equality. Accordingly, k0 = m0 is to mean that
this equation is deducible in the calculus K(=) with the two rules
⇒ 0 = 0; k = m ⇒ k′ = m′.
The ‘deontic infinity’ of IN: Because of lack of time and material we can really
construct only finitely many numerals. However, we shall never be obliged to terminate
the constructions in K(IN). - Moreover, by the rules of K(IN) we successively obtain only
diverse numerals 0, 0′, 0′′, . . . . These facts suggest to say that IN is infinite. (We shall
return to this point.)
For ‘external reasons’ it is impossible to apply the rules of K(IN) infinitely many times. So we
cannot construct infinitely long ‘numerals’ 0′′. . .′. However, with respect to arithmetical induc-
tion, such figures should also be excluded from IN by internal rules. Therefore, we replace the
rules of K(IN) by the following Γ-rules and, similarly, the rules of K(=) by the following ∆-rules.
(An infinitely long ‘numeral’ Ω ≡ 0′′. . .′ cannot be distinguished from Ω′. So Γ|Ω| is not rejected
by the rules fixed below . We shall, however, not make use of these informal remarks.)
Given any first order language L0 as considered so far, we extend it by introducing
new sentences of the forms Γ|%|, r ε IN, ∆|% = σ|, and r = s where Γ, |, ε, IN,∆, and =
(which is short for =IN) are particular new symbols, r and s range over arbitrary values
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of variables of L, and % and σ range over strings of (atomic) symbols occurring in those
values. To introduce the use of sentences of these forms we include just the following ‘Γ-’
and ‘∆-rules’ among the internal rules of the language expanded so:
Γ|0| ⇒ ⊥ ∆|0 = 0| ⇒ ⊥
Γ|%′| ⇒ Γ|%| ∆|%′ = σ′| ⇒ ∆|% = σ|
r ε IN :⇒ ¬Γ|r| r = s :⇒ ¬∆|r = s|.
(But we do not fix any external rule to restrict assertions of sentences considered here.)
For any constant r, ∆|r′ = 0| does not occur as premise of an instance of an internal
rule. Therefore ∆|r′ = 0| cannot be rejected, ¬∆|r′ = 0| must not be asserted, r′ = 0
must also not be asserted, and hence ¬ r′ = 0 may be asserted.
By the Γ-rules it is just forbidden to assert Γ|0|, Γ|0′|, Γ|0′′|, . . . . So we may assert
0 ε IN, 0′ ε IN, 0′′ ε IN, . . . but no other sentences of the form r ε IN. - Similarly, by the
∆-rules it is just forbidden to assert ∆|0 = 0|, ∆|0′ = 0′|, ∆|0′′ = 0′′|, . . . . So we may
assert 0 = 0, 0′ = 0′, 0′′ = 0′′, . . . but no other equations between numerals.
In this §4 we write x, y for variables ranging over numerals, and z for variables ranging
over numerals at least.
Propositions:
(a) ∀z (z ε IN↔ z′ ε IN) (cf. the infinity of IN)
(b) ∀x, y (x = y ↔ x′ = y′)
(c) ∀x¬ (x′ = 0), ∀y ¬ (0 = y′).
Proofs: (a)(←) We ought to assert ∃z (¬ (z ε IN) ∧ z′ ε IN) only if, for some r, r ε IN
is rejected and r′ ε IN has been asserted. To this, Γ|r′| should be rejected by the rule
Γ|r′| :⇒ Γ|r|. So also Γ|r| must be rejected (inversion). But then r ε IN may be asserted
(‘contradiction’). By these arguments, ∃z (¬ (z ε IN) ∧ z′ ε IN) is rejected. So we may
assert its negation and so, by R13, ∀z (z ε IN ← z′ ε IN). - (a)(→), (b), and (c) can be
proved similarly. 
Principle of arithmetical induction: Admissible is the rule
A(0), ∀x [A(x)→ A(x′)] ⇒ ∀xA(x).
Proof: Since not all figures denoted by % are constants, we shall use new sentences
Λ|%| (where the symbol ‘|’ does not occur in %) instead of % ε IN ∧ A(%). As additional
internal rules for assertions of the form \Λ|%| we fix just the rules Λ|%| :⇒ ¬Γ|%| and
Λ|k| :⇒ A(k), for numerals k. (So we have Λ|k| ↔ A(k).) - Assume now that we have
A(0), ∀x [A(x)→ A(x′)], and n ε IN. Then the rules ¬Λ|0| ⇒ ⊥ and ¬Λ|%′| ⇒ ¬Λ|%| are
admissible, and (because of n ε IN) it is forbidden by the rules Γ|0| ⇒ ⊥ and Γ|%′| ⇒ Γ|%|
to assert Γ|n|. Here we may replace Γ by ¬Λ. This means, it is in the same way forbidden
by the rules ¬Λ|0| ⇒ ⊥ and ¬Λ|%′| ⇒ ¬Λ|%| to assert ¬Λ|n|. So we have ¬¬A(n) for
all n ε IN, and so ¬∃x¬A(x). 
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‘Induction principle for equations’: Admissible is the rule
A(0, 0), ∀x, y [A(x, y)→ A(x′, y′)] ⇒ ∀x, y [x = y → A(x, y)].
For the proof of it we have to consider the ∆-rules instead of the Γ-rules. By this principle
we can conclude: r = s→ r ε IN ∧ s ε IN. - By (b) and arithmetical induction, we easily
obtain n = n. Moreover, we also have
(d) k = m ∧ A(k) → A(m).
Proof: Let e be a variable for the ‘empty figure’ as well as for figures which can be
constructed from it by applying the calculus rule: q ⇒ ′q. Then we have
∀e [A(0e)→ A(0e)] and ∀x, y {∀e [A(xe)→ A(ye)]→ ∀e [A(x′e)→ A(y′e)]}.
Now we obtain (d) by the induction principle for equations.
From (d) follows the comparativity, k = m∧k = n→ m = n, and hence the symmetry
and transitivity of the equality on IN. This relation is, therefore, an equivalence relation
under which all formulas considered are invariant.
We shall also apply other induction principles that can be explained by arithmetical
induction.
Recursion as a way of generating relations: Addition in IN, e.g., can be introduced
by fixing the following assertion rules for new sentences:
Add(k, 0, n) :⇒ n = k
Add(k,m′, n) :⇒ ∃x[Add(k,m, x) ∧ n = x′].
These rules can be considered as special cases of
r ε S0 :⇒ A(r)
r ε Sm′ :⇒ B(r,m, Sm)
where S 
 IxyZ(A(x), B(x, y, Z)). A(. . .) and B(. . .) are permitted to be formulas of an
extended object language L+ which is the least language containing certain elementary
formulas as well as formulas of the shape t ε Z, and is closed under ∧,∨,¬,∃, and ε I
(with the ‘induction operator’ ‘I’). Z is assumed to be a variable for sets or relations
(as Sm) that are definable in L+. Such variables may be bound by ‘I’ but must not be
bound by ‘∃’ in formulas of L+.
The latter rules can also be inverted since the assertions on their left are not to be
subjected to additional restrictions, and even the language L+ is non-circular as can be
shown by induction on the outlined construction of formulas of L+ (see [19, pp. 426 ff.,
452] or 7.3). The predicator ‘Add’ represents a function, ‘+’. An introduction of definite
description terms (as terms of the form s+ t, e.g.) will be sketched in §9. - As easily seen,
all recursive functions are definable in L+.
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For constructive or predicative analysis in the sense of [8] inclusive of measure theory and
functional analysis (as in [18], e.g) there suffice real numbers which are given by rational Cauchy
sequences definable in L+. (See also the end of §7.)
We have unproblematically obtained the above result (a), by which IN is infinite. This
result, however, has substantial consequences. To give an example, we consider the power
(Pow) of natural numbers. The proposition
99
9
ε IN
(in which the iterated definite description ‘999 ’ occurs) can be considered as an abbre-
viation of the composite sentence
∃x, y [Pow(9, 9, x) ∧ Pow(9, x, y) ∧ y ε IN],
a generalization of which can inductively be proved by a well known procedure. It is,
however, not possible really to construct a figure n by the rules of K(IN) which satisfies
99
9
= n. The existential sentence 999 ε IN must, therefore, not actually be asserted in the
primary game for the whole history of mankind. Nevertheless, it would not violate a rule
successively to perform proper assertions and ultimately to assert 999 ε IN. Accordingly,
we may assert the double negation of this sentence, which, therefore, can be understood
classically.
A more general problem concerns sentences of the form ∀x ε K.∃y A(x, y), i.e.
∀x (x ε K → ∃y A(x, y)). At best we can proof such a sentence directly by describing an
effective procedure, p, and showing that
(*) ∀x ε K.{∃y (p : x 7→ y) ∧ ∀y [(p : x 7→ y)→ A(x, y)]}.
Here, p : x 7→ y is to mean that p with the input x prescribes to produce the output y
finally.
The assertion of (*) shows for any k ε K how one can ‘on principle’ find anm satisfying
¬¬A(k,m). In many cases, however, p with a ‘large’ input k will not really yield an output
m in available time. How can we understand the existence of such an m? To this, we
consider p as a system of rules by which certain successions of action steps are permitted
(or even required) and the others are forbidden. Every permitted step is assumed to be
uniquely determined by the input and the preceding steps.
If an input, k, is given, the ‘classical existence’ of a corresponding output (i.e. ¬¬∃y (p :
k → y)) means that it is permitted (i.e. not forbidden) by the rules of p to perform certain
steps which finally yield an output.
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§5. Substitutional combined with objectual quantification
Sentences as “All ants are mortal” or “Some apples are red” have the form “All P are Q”
or “Some P are Q”, respectively, or - in a ‘modern’ manner of writing - ∀x (Px → Qx)
or ∃x (Px ∧Qx), respectively. However, the use of such sentences cannot adequately be
reconstructed as in §1 since we have not enough proper names for ants or apples, e.g.,
as values of the variable x at our disposal. So we also consider sentences as “This is an
ant” or “This ant has only five legs” with ‘indicators’ as “this” or “this ant”, which can
temporarily be used like proper names for objects (as solids or events, e.g.). We include
indicators among constants (though we use them instead of ‘objectual variables’). They
may also occur in other constants and in sentences of the language consideed here.
Under a denotation of an object by an indicator or of an indicator by an object we
understand a naming which, however, is in general only valid in a special situation (or
context). Such a denotation can result, for instance, from pointing at that object and
pronouncing that indicator at the same time.
In many cases, an object in question cannot be shown to a listener so that the corresponding
denotation is restricted to the speaker. However, if he has said to himself “This ant has only five
legs”, e.g., then he may say to any listener that there exists an ant with five legs only (cf. P(∃den)
below). Accordingly, we need not presuppose here that the denoted objects do not depend on the
concerned persons. (Constellations of stars, e.g., do so). - We shall not deal with several problems
concerning denotations as, for instance, the danger of misunderstandings, which can result from
not sufficiently clear bounds of situations.
A denotation of a single indicator is said to be simple. We distinguish any two simple
denotations that are created by different acts of naming. If u1, . . . , uk are different indi-
cators, and αi is a simple denotation of ui (i = 1, . . . , k), then we say that α1, . . . , αk is
a denotation of u1, . . . , uk. Let all denotations considered in the following be composed
in this way from simple denotations of different indicators.
If α is a denotation of u, and β 
 β1, . . . , βm is a further denotation, then let αβ
result from α by adding only those members βi of β that are not denotations of members
of u. (That is, let αβ coincide with α on u and otherwise with β.)
In the following α, β range over denotations (which may also be empty).
If Φ is a formula or a list of constants, let α∆Φ mean that α is a denotation of at least
all indicators occurring in Φ. We compactly write \A|α for the assertion of a sentence
A ‘in α’, i.e. in a situation in which α is valid. Then α is assumed to satisfy α∆A. We
identify \A|α with \A|αA where αA is the restriction of α to all indicators occurring in
A.
Now we extend the primary game by transferring its rules (see §1) to such assertions
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as follows:
P(∧) \ (A ∧B)|α :⇒ \A|α and \B|α
P(∨) \ (A ∨B)|α :⇒ \A|α or \B|α
P(∃ den) \ ∃xA(x)|α :⇒ for some value r of x :
for some β∆r : \A(r)|αβ
P(¬) \¬A|α :⇒ A has been rejected in α.
Let the primary game also contain certain corresponding external rules and internal
rules for elementary sentences (cf. §1), but let it not contain further rules for compound
sentences. Accordingly, the above primary rules for compound sentences may be inverted.
We assume that all instances of internal rules for elementary sentences containing
indicators have the form E1|α, . . . , En|α ⇒ E|α with α∆(E1, . . . , En, E). Then, by
a corresponding external rule, we let E pass for anchored in α, if E1, . . . , En pass for
anchored in α.
5.1 Remark: The existential quantifiers introduced by P(∃ den) combine both substi-
tutional and (in general) objectual quantification. In 10.2 (where we consider a more
extensive language) we shall show that we may commute consecutive existential quan-
tifiers introduced there. This result does not contradict the well-known fact that in the
context of Quines discussion (see [10, §28]) it is in general not allowed to commute con-
secutive existential quantifiers when one is objectual and the other substitutional.
Example: In the context of Quines discussion it is not true that every non-empty set
has a subset containing a unique element. Nevertheless, we may argue as follows. Let a
set be given by a constant a 
 {x : A(x)} together with a denotation α∆{a}. Suppose
that this set contains at least one element:
∃x (x ε a)|α.
Then there exists a constant r and a denotation β with β∆r such that
(r ε a)|αβ.
From this we can conclude the following (where {r} is short for {y : y = r}):
(r ε a ∧ {r} = {r})|αβ
∃x (x ε a ∧ {r} = {x})|αβ
∃Z ∃x (x ε a ∧ Z = {x})|α.
which means that a has a subset, Z, containing a unique element.
(Here, the variable Z ranges over certain sets of values of x.) So in α we may assert
∃x (x ε a)→ ∃Z ∃x (x ε a ∧ Z = {x}) and, therefore,
∃x ∃Z (x ε a ∧ Z = {x})→ ∃Z ∃x (x ε a ∧ Z = {x}),
which, however, becomes untrue for a merely substitutional variable instead of Z. Notice
that the above unit set is given by the ‘pair’ {r}, β.
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3.1 and the following proposition show how far the means of speech of the classical
game are sufficient to inform about empirical datas (cf. §6). To this end we consider
sentences of the form A ≡ ∃x (E1(x)∧ . . .∧En(x)) (n > 0) in which no indicators occur.
For such sentences, A, we introduce new ‘auxiliary sentences’ −A, and fix these rules: For
values r of x and denotations β∆r,
Int(−∃) \E1(r)|β, . . . , \ En(r)|β, \−A :⇒ \⊥,
Aux(−∃) \−A :⇒ A has been rejected without regard to Int(−∃).
Let Int(−∃) be an internal rule and Aux(−∃) an ‘auxiliary’ (not ‘internal’) rule.
5.2 Proposition: Let E1(x), . . . , E(x) (n ≥ 1) be elementary formulas in which no
indicators occur, and let A ≡ ∃x (E1(x) ∧ . . . ∧ En(x)). Then, in the primary game, we
ought to assert ¬¬A only if, for some tuple r of values of x and some denotation β∆r,
the sentences E1(r), . . . , En(r) have been anchored in β. If ¬¬A may be asserted in the
primary game, then A may be asserted in this game at the same time.
Proof: If we assert −A without violating an internal rule, then, by Int(−∃),
E1(r) ∧ . . . ∧ En(r) becomes rejected in β for every value r of x and every β with
β∆r, hence A becomes rejected, and hence ¬A is not rejected. Now we assume, that
¬¬A may already be asserted. Then ¬A has been rejected, and then, by the latter
argument, \ − A would violate an internal rule, i.e. −A has been rejected. By 3.4 and
since Int(−∃) is the only internal rule concerning −A, it follows that, for some r and
some β∆r, E1(r), . . . , En(r) have been asserted in β or are deducible by the internal
rules from some elementary sentences D1, . . . , Dm that have been asserted in α for some
α∆(D1, . . . , Dm). Then \A would not violate an internal rule, and D1, . . . , Dm should
have been anchored in α, and then also E1(r), . . . , En(r) pass for anchored in β (by a
rule mentioned above). 
Further investigations on assertions under denotations will be performed in §10.
Literal equality of strings of symbols is a relation of individual occurrences of such strings
at arbitrary places, also outside of corresponding equations. Therefore, literal equality can be
introduced and investigated by means of indicators for such occurrences. (Here we do not go
into details and do also not discuss problems that arise from the fact that (particularly in §1 and
§2) we have tacitly used ‘syntactical’ properties of formulas and their components which concern
literal equality.)
§6. Purposes of assertions in the classical game
Let the classical game be that assertion game in which a sentence A of L may be
asserted iff ¬¬A may be asserted in the primary game.
The rules R1 - R29 (see §2 and §3) inclusive of ¬¬A ⇒ A and analogous rules for
sentences with indicators are admissible in the classical game. This means that in this
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game we may apply classical logic. - In the following we show which purposes assertions of
different kinds of sentences can serve in the classical game, and that this game preserves
all means of speech which are indispensable for those purposes.
Due to 3.1 (which also holds for elementary sentences containing indicators), we should
assert an elementary sentence, E, in the classical game only if E has been anchored.
Accordingly, for the listener or reader the ‘classical’ assertion of E can substitute a first
hand knowledge of an anchoring of E, in particular a perception or observation, or the
result of an investigation of objects.
Due to R01 and R03, in the classical game the rules
A, A→ B ⇒ B
∀x Ax ⇒ Ar (for values r of x )
have the property that their premises may be asserted only if the pertinent conclusion
may already be asserted. So we have in the classical game:
\ (A→ B) can serve the listener or reader as the advice to assert B
(perhaps to himself only) as soon as A may be asserted.
\∀xAx can serve as a substitute for \Ar, for any value r of x.
Similarly, in the context of §5,
\∀xA(x)|α can serve as a substitute for \A(b)|αβ,
for any constant b and any denotation β of the indicators occurring in b.
By means of conjunction we can - more clearly arranged - write A1 ∧ A2 ∧ A3 → B for
A1 → [A2 → (A3 → B)].
The following holds in the primary game. An assertion of the form \A∨B can without
loss of information be replaced by the shorter assertion \A or \B. In the same way, the
assertion of an existential sentence, ∃xAx, is dispensable since it can be replaced by the
assertion of Ar, for some value r of x.
However, what we have just stated does not hold for existential sentences ∃xA(x)
with a variable x whose values may contain indicators. Note that sentences A containing
indicators may in general be asserted only in particular situations. On the other hand,
many empirically obtained facts can - in any situations - be summarized to sentences of
the form ∃x (E1(x) ∧ . . . ∧ En(x)) with elementary components Ei(x). Accordingly, we
have adduced 5.3 by which even from the classical assertion of ∃x (E1(x) ∧ . . . ∧ En(x))
we can conclude that E1(r), . . . , En(r) should have been anchored for some value r of x
and some denotation of r. This shows how far the means of speech of the classical game
are sufficient to inform about empirical datas.
Sentences of the form ∀x ε K. ∃y A(x, y) have been investigated at the end of §4. A
generalization of those investigations should still be worked out.
Since we dispose of certain admissible inference rules, composite formulas can be used
as marks for something of data processing. As is well known, all inference rules of ‘con-
structive’ or ‘intuitionistic’ logic are also admissible in classical logic. Hence, (especially
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mathematical) composite formulas are in the classical game at least as useful as proces-
sing marks as in a language in which only intuitionistic logic is available. - For purposes,
however, which have not been regarded here, a more restrictive use of assertions may be
more suitable than the classical use.
Hypothetical assertions
In everyday speech and in empirical sciences one necessarily proceeds more liberally than
in our classical game. So one does not only assert established facts but also uses universal
hypotheses or conjectures, which often do not even get cited. If H is the conjunction of
all current hypotheses, we could use (assert) certain sentences B as short for H → B.
Indeed, for any admissible inference rule A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B the rule H → A1, . . . , H →
An ⇒ H → B is also admissible. But as soon as H becomes rejected, it becomes
obviously unserviceable to assert sentences of the form H → B (or abbreviations of
them).
Accordingly, if H contains (probably) untrue hypotheses (such as simplifications of
conjectures) we can instead of H → B better use the statement that B has been deduced
from H and certain already verified sentences by the rules of classical logic (e.g.). This
statement reminds of necessity (cf. [9, p.111], e.g.). - Our investigations of §11 will show
how we can include sentences of of the form “B is deducible from H by given rules” in
the object language.
Sometimes we are convinced that if we perform a certain action a, then - after an
additional time δ - we shall obviously have attained a purpose e1 or another purpose e2,
for instance. We explain the intended effect of the advice then to act as if the according
hypothesis ∀τ (Aτ−δ → Eτ1 ∨ Eτ2 ) (with τ for moments) holds in the classical game:
By this advice, we should act as if the following holds: If Aτ−δ may be asserted in the
classical game, then Eτ1 ∨ Eτ2 may also be asserted in that game - and hence Eτ1 or Eτ2
will have been anchored (due to an analogue to 5.3). (This anchoring will be anticipated,
if we assert Aτ−δ before τ .
§7. Preliminaries on higher order languages
In the following we speak ‘about’ so-called abstract objects like sets and relations. But
we do not presuppose that they exist independently of the signs by which they are given
(‘designated’, ‘denoted’, or the like). What we shall say of sets can be regarded as a mere
manner of speaking. If we say that a sign S is (or designates) a set we only mean this:
1. For all relevant constants (or, especially, proper names) c, we dispose of sentences
with the meaning “c is an element of S”. 2. S is to be used ‘abstractively’ (within a
given language) so that any occurrence of S in any asserted sentence (of that language)
may be replaced by any other set sign that is said to be equal to S. (However, we
do not simply identify sets that are extensionally equal. So one may prefer the word
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“attribute” or “property” in place of “set”.) For “is an element of” we shall write ‘∈’ in the
metalanguage (for which we use our colloquial language), and ‘ε’ in the object language
to be introduced. In the metalanguage we also use other familiar set theoretical signs.
We shall introduce a ramified type theory (cf. [7], [11], [13], [17], e.g.) in a cumulative
version.
Given a set E of elementary formulas in which certain constants may occur. Those
constants are said to be of order 0. We shall introduce sets of order 1, whose elements
are constants of order 0 (or objects denoted by them), sets of order 2, whose elements
are constants of order 0 or sets of order 1, etc. So a set of order n contains only elements
that have orders < n. However, a set of order n will also be said to have any order larger
than n.
To this end, we shall construct a set A of (first or) higher order sentences and intro-
duce an assertion game, which contains certain ‘primary rules’ to restrict assertions of
sentences belonging to A. Since this ‘primary game’ does not contain further rules of
assertion, and since all sentences of A can be shown to be non-circular, the primary rules
for sentences of A \ E can be inverted so that both, those rules and their inverses, can
also be used as inference rules. By this means, even all usual inference rules of classical
logic can (as in §2, §3) be shown to be admissible in the ‘classical game’ which is given
by the agreement that a sentence may be asserted in this game iff its double negation
may be asserted in the primary game (cf. §3).
So our first main task will be to show that all sentences of A are non-circular.
Now we incompletely sketch the higher order languages that will be introduced in §8.
Assume that we already dispose of certain elementary formulas and terms, which are
said to be original terms. All variables that occur in those formulas or terms are said
to be of order 0. Let
V0 = set of all variables of order 0
Tor = set of all original terms, V0 ⊂ Tor
E = set of all elementary formulas (to be considered).
V0 is permitted to contain variables of several sorts. (Of course, V0 is supposed to contain
denumerably many variables of every of those sorts.) Let constants / sentences be
terms / formulas, respectively, without free occurring variables.
We shall introduce the following sets of higher order terms and formulas:
Tn = set of all (simple) terms of order n,
Fn = set of all formulas of order n.
Here and in the following, m,n range over (signs of) ordinal numbers belonging to a
given set Ω with IN ⊆ Ω ⊆ C0. We define
Cn 
 set of all constants belonging to Tn,
Cn 

⋃
j∈IN+ C
j
n,
which is the set of all j-tuples (c1, . . . , cj) of constants ci ∈ Cn with arbitrary length
j ∈ IN+ 
 IN \ {0}. Let also be given two disjunct denumerable sets V and V of ‘new’
variables, which do not occur in elements of Tor ∪ E . We shall use the elements of V as
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variables for elements of
⋃
n∈Ω Cn, i.e. for constants of arbitrary order, and the elements of
V as variables for elements of ⋃n∈Ω Cn, i.e. for arbitrary tuples of constants. - Moreover,
let
T n 

⋃
j∈IN+ T jn ∪ V.
So Cn is the set of all constants belonging to T n.
As signs of the object language for Cn, Cn, and ∈ we shall use Cn, Cn, and ε, respectively.
In this introduction, x, x1, x2, . . . range over variables of V0 ∪ V, and x, y over variables
of V.
All elements of Cn \ C0 will be introduced as subsets of
⋃
m<n Cm. A constant of the
form {x ε Cm : A(x)} will denote the set of all elements c ∈ Cm satisfying A(c). A
sentence of the form ∃x ε Cm. A(x) is to mean that there exists a constant c of order m
satisfying A(c). By this means, j-ary relations (j ∈ IN+) can be described in the form
{(x1, . . . , xj) ε Cjm : A(x1, . . . , xj)}

{y ε Cm : ∃x1 ε Cm. . . . ∃xj ε Cm. (y =m (x1, . . . , xj) ∧A(x1, . . . , xj))},
(where y does not occur in A(x1, . . . , xj)). To this end, the sign ‘=m’ must previously be
introduced suitably. - So we at first demand that
s ∈ Tn if s ∈ Tor ∪ V,
{x ε Cm : F} ∈ Tn if F ∈ Fn, m < n,
E ∈ Fn if E ∈ E ,
(F ∧G), (F ∨G) ∈ Fn if F,G ∈ Fn,
(¬F ) ∈ Fn if F ∈ Fn,
(∃x ε Cm. F ) ∈ Fn if F ∈ Fn, m < n,
(s ε t) ∈ Fn if s ∈ T n, t ∈ Tn.
We shall replace these and certain further demands by corresponding rules of constructi-
on. - Note that we need not deal with complicated types that include information about
‘arities’ of relations. So we may simply identify types with orders.
For mathematical purposes we want also to dispose of sequences R of relations
R(0), R(1), R(2), . . . ∈ Cn satisfying
(c, k) ε R(l)↔ (c) ε Cm ∧ k < l ∧ A((c), k, R(k))
for all tuples (c) ≡ (c1, . . . , cj) of constants and all k, l ∈ Ω, if any formula A(x, µ, z) ∈ Fn
and any ordinal m < n are given. By this ‘recursive characterization’, R(l) depends
upon the relations R(k) with ordinals k < l only. - We designate R by (Jx ε Cm, µ, z :
A(x, µ, z)). Accordingly, we demand:
(Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F )(q) ∈ Tn if F ∈ Fn, q ∈ T (Ω), m < n, µ ∈ V(Ω), z ∈ V
where T (Ω) (⊆ Tor) is a given set of terms whose substitution instances are elements of
Ω, and V(Ω) = V0 ∩ T (Ω) is a set of variables for elements of Ω. (‘J’ is an ‘induction
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operator’; cf. §4) - Then it can be shown that there also exists a sequence S of relations
S(0), S(1), S(2), . . . ∈ Cn satisfying
c ε S(0) ↔ c ε Cm ∧ A(c)
c ε S(k + 1) ↔ c ε Cm ∧ B(c, k, S(k))
for all c ∈ ⋃n∈Ω Cn and all k ∈ IN, if the formulas A(x), B(x, µ, z) ∈ Fn and the order
m < n are given. (For purposes of classical reasoning, the particles →, ↔, and ∀ can be
defined as in §1 and §3.)
We want to introduce equations x=y such that all formulas considered are invariant
under (=), i.e. satisfy c=d ∧A(c)→ A(d) for all constants c, d and all formulas A(x) of
arbitrary orders. To this end, equal constants must especially have the same order, and
equal sets must contain the same elements:
c = d → ∀µ ε C0. (c ε Cµ ↔ d ε Cµ)
c = d ∧ ¬ (c ε C0) → c ⊆ d ∧ d ⊆ c
where µ ∈ V(Ω) (again), and c ⊆ d means that c is a subset of d (see below). Since the
formulas c ε Cµ and c ⊆ d should belong to the object language to be introduced, we
demand and define the following (where ∃x ε t. F is to be read as “For some x, x ε t and
F ”):
(t ε Cq) ∈ Fn if t ∈ Tn, q ∈ T (Ω)
(∃x ε t. F ) ∈ Fn if t ∈ Tn, F ∈ Fn
∀x ε s. F 
 ¬∃x ε s. ¬F
s ⊆ t 
 ∀x ε s. x ε t ∧ ¬ (s ε C0) ∧ ¬ (t ε C0).
However, if q (is or) contains a variable, we do not rank Cq with the terms of
⋃
n∈Ω Tn.
Now we presuppose that (=0) represents an equivalence relation on C0 (which is suitable
for certain purposes), and that s =0 t is a formula of F for terms s, t. Assume that all
terms of Tor and all formulas of E are invariant under (=0). For terms s, t of any order
we define
s ∼ t 
 ∀µ ε C0. (s ε Cµ ↔ t ε Cµ)
s = t 
 s =0 t ∨ (s ⊆ t ∧ t ⊆ s ∧ s ∼ t).
Of course, we demand that
(s =0 t) ∈ Fn if s, t ∈ Tn.
Then it can be shown that all formulas of
⋃
n∈ΩFn are invariant under (=). This is our
second main task.
The ‘type-free’ relations (⊆), (∼), and (=) are definable in our object language but
they are neither elements of C nor elements of elements of C.
Given a formula A(x), a tuple c ≡ (c1, . . . , cj) ∈ Cm of constants, and some i = 1, . . . , j.
Then A(ci) means that the ith component of c satisfies A(x). Since our object language
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also contains variables y for such tuples c of constants, we postulate, in addition, that
the object language contains a formula expressing that the ith component of any given
value of y belongs to Cm and satisfies A(x). For that formula we take ∃x ε pim(y, i). A(x)
(with pi for “projection"). Generalizing we demand
(∃x ε pim(s, p). F ) ∈ Fn if m < n, s ε T n, p ∈ T (IN+), F ∈ Fn
where T (IN+) (⊆ Tor) is a given set of terms (inclusive of variables) whose substitution
instances are elements of IN+. Of course, we want to obtain that
∃x ε pim((c1, . . . , cj), i). A(x) ↔ ci ε Cm ∧A(ci)
(i = 1, . . . , j) holds in the object language.
For constructive or predicative analysis in the sense of [8] inclusive of measure theory and
functional analysis (as in [18], e.g.) there suffice real numbers that are given by first order Cauchy
sequences of rational numbers. In the domain of those real numbers there converges every real
Cauchy sequence that is given by a corresponding first order double sequence of rational numbers.
Suitable for predicative analysis are functions f : A → IR with A ⊆ IRj , such that if α1, . . . , αj
are sequences of the mentioned sort which satisfy (α1, . . . , αj) : IN→ A then f ◦ (α1, . . . , αj) is a
sequence of that sort. So we can pursue predicative analysis in languages of low orders (as stressed
in [17], see also [8, p.3]). - Nevertheless, to designate orders or types we also admit transfinite
ordinal numbers.
§8. Higher order languages
In this §8 we introduce only sentences in which no ìndicators (cf. §5) occur. But in §10 we shall
also consider sentences containing indicators, whose meaning depends on situations or contexts.
The following sets (which we have already mentioned in §7) are supposed to be de-
cidable: E , Tor,V0,V,V, and the set C0 of all constants of order 0, i.e belonging to Tor.
For all w ∈ V0 let C(w) ⊆ C0 be the set of all values of w, which is also supposed to
be decidable. Two variables w, x ∈ V0 are said to be of the same sort iff C(w) = C(x).
In the metalanguage we sometimes use the particles ∧, →, ↔, and ∀. In place of ∧ we
sometimes write the comma.
For any element Φ of Tor ∪ E we define:
V0(Φ) 
 set of all variables occurring (free) in Φ,
∗ ∈ S0(Φ) 
 ∗ is a substitution of all variables w ∈ V0(Φ) by
values w∗ of them (so that ∀w ∈ V0(Φ). w∗ ∈ C(w)),
T (w) 
 {r ∈ Tor : ∀ ∗ ∈ S0(r). r∗ ∈ C(w)} for w ∈ V0.
T (w) is the set of all original terms whose substitution instances are elements of C(w).
For all w ∈ V0 we have T (w) ∩ C0 = C(w).
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Let an ordered set (Ω, <), Ω ⊆ C0, be introduced, which includes IN (in the usual
succession) as an initial segment and permits all applications of (transfinite) induction
that will be performed in the following. The equality (=) in Ω is assumed to be the literal
equality (≡). The elements of Ω are said to be ordinals (ordinal numbers). We suppose
the following: If k ∈ Ω then k′ ∈ Ω where k′ is the (immediate) successor of k; for any
two ordinals k, l it is decidable whether k < l. - Examples for Ω are IN and the set of all
ordinals of the form ωk ·nk +ωk−1 ·nk−1 + . . .+ω ·n1 +n0 where k, n0, . . . , nk ∈ IN, and
nk > 0 if k > 0.
As variables for elements of Ω / IN+, respectively, we use elements of a denumera-
ble and decidable set V(Ω) / V(IN+) ⊆ V0. As metavariables we take: i, j for elements
of IN+; k, l,m, n for elements of Ω; and λ, µ, ν for elements of V(Ω). Let T (Ω) =
T (λ) = Ω ∪ ⋃x∈V(Ω)∪V(IN+){x, x′, x′′, . . .}. The equations (q = r) and inequations
(q < r) with q, r ∈ T (Ω) are assumed to be elements of E . - Let T (IN+) = T (κ) =
IN+ ∪ ⋃x∈V(IN+){x, x′, x′′, . . .} where κ ∈ V(IN+).
We admit that E contains formulas of the shape ((s1, . . . , sj) ε P ) with s1, . . . , sj ∈ Tor
but P /∈ Tor. Here, P may especially be IN or Ω (if j = 1). So let IN,Ω /∈ C0.
For original terms and elementary formulas we presuppose (where swr is defined as in
§2):
P1: s ∈ Tor, w ∈ V0, r ∈ T (w) → swr ∈ Tor.
P2: E ∈ E , w ∈ V0, r ∈ T (w) → Ewr ∈ E .
Let W 
 V0 ∪ V, W 
W ∪ V (see §7).
In the following w, x, y, z, x1, x2, . . . range over arbitrary variables (belongig to W), and
x, y over elements of V. Distinctly denoted variables are assumed to be distinct. Accor-
dingly, a list x1, . . . , xn of variables is assumed to be a list of distinct variables.
Induktive definitions of Tn, T n and Fn (n ∈ Ω):
Sentences (belonging to a metalanguage) of the forms (s ∈ Tn), (s ∈ T n) and (F ∈ Fn)
are to be verified by their deductions by the following ‘T ,F-rules’. (In these rules, ⇒
indicates the permitted deduction steps; the pertinent conditions for applications of these
rules are quoted behind the word “if”.)
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⇒ s ∈ Tn (if s ∈ Tor)
⇒ z ∈ Tn (if z ∈ V)
F ∈ Fn ⇒ {x ε Cm : F} ∈ Tn (if m < n)
F ∈ Fn ⇒ (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F )(q) ∈ Tn (if m < n, z ∈ V, q ∈ T (Ω) )
⇒ x ∈ T n
s1, . . . , sj ∈ Tn ⇒ (s1, . . . , sj) ∈ T n
⇒ E ∈ Fn (if E ∈ E)
F,G ∈ Fn ⇒ (F ∧G), (F ∨G) ∈ Fn (two rules)
F ∈ Fn ⇒ (¬F ) ∈ Fn
F ∈ Fn ⇒ (∃x ε Cm. F ) ∈ Fn (if m < n, x ∈ W)
s ∈ T n, t ∈ Tn ⇒ (s ε t) ∈ Fn
t ∈ Tn, F ∈ Fn ⇒ (∃x ε t. F ) ∈ Fn
s ∈ T n, F ∈ Fn ⇒ (∃x ε pim(s, p). F ) ∈ Fn (if m < n, x ∈ W, p ∈ T (IN+))
s, t ∈ Tn ⇒ (s =0 t) ∈ Fn
s ∈ T n ⇒ (s ε Cpq ) ∈ Fn (if p ∈ T (IN+), q ∈ T (Ω)).
Thus, T0 = Tor ∪ V, and E ⊂ F0. - The following occurrences of variables in terms
or formulas are said to be bound: x in (∃x ε Cm. F ) and in (∃x ε pim(s, p). F ), x in
{x ε Cm : F} and in (∃x ε t. F ), and x, µ, z in (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F ). All other occurrences
of variables in terms or formulas are said to be free, i.e. not bound. - We presuppose, of
course, that if (Φ ∈ Tn), (Φ ∈ T n), or (Φ ∈ Fn) is a conclusion of one of the latter rules
except the first or seventh, then Φ does not belong to Tor ∪ E . - Sometimes we shall as
usual omit brackets from formulas. - Definitions:
An 
 set of all sentences of order n (⊂ Fn);
T 
 ⋃n∈Ω Tn; T 
 ⋃n∈Ω T n; F 
 ⋃n∈ΩFn;
C 
 ⋃n∈Ω Cn; C 
 ⋃n∈Ω Cn; and A
 ⋃n∈ΩAn.
Notice that Cjm, Cm, Cm /∈ C. Similarly, Cpq , pim(s, p) /∈ T . - As metavariables we shall
use: p for elements of T (IN+); q for elements of T (Ω); r, s, t for terms (i.e. elements of
T ∪ T ); F,G,H for formulas (i.e. elements of F); a, b, c, d for constants (i.e. elements
of C ∪ C); A,B for sentences (i.e. elements of A); and, for instance, A(x1, . . . , xj) for
formulas, in which at most the variables x1, . . . , xj occur free.
We shall write s for lists s1, . . . , sj ; (s) for tuples (s1, . . . , sj) of terms si ∈ T ; and
‘s1, . . . , sj ∈ Tn’ for ‘s1 ∈ Tn, . . . , sj ∈ Tn’, e.g. x is to be distinguished from x.
To formulate assertion rules for sentences of A we use some definitions:
Cm(x) 


C(x) for x ∈ V0
Cm for x ∈ V
Cm for x ∈ V
(c1, . . . , cj) ∈ Cm(x1, . . . , xk) 
 j = k ∧ ∀ i ≤ j. ci ∈ Cm(xi).
Cm(x) is the set of all elements of Cm that are values of x.
For Φ ∈ T ∪ T ∪ F and U ⊆ W let
U(Φ) 
 set of all variables ∈ U that occur free in Φ.
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A term s / a formula F is said to be invariant under an equivalence relation (≈) on Cn
iff for all (c), (d) ∈ Cn(w) with {w} = {w1, . . . , wj} = W(s) / W(F ), respectively, the
following holds:
c ≈ d → swc ≈ swd ,
c ≈ d → (Fwc ↔ Fwd ), respectively,
where (c) ≈ (d) 
 c ≈ d 
 c1 ≈ d1 ∧ . . . ∧ cj ≈ dj
and the substitutions wc and
w
d are defined as in §2. (This has been formulated somewhat
beforehand.)
Assumptions: 1. We have agreed upon certain primary rules (or usage) for sentences of
E which do not refer to assertions of sentences of A \ E .
2. E contains all formulas s =0 t with s, t ∈ Tor.
3. (=0) represents a given equivalence relation on C0 under which all terms of Tor and
all formulas of E are invariant. For all w ∈ V0, the scope C(w) of values of w is invariant,
i.e., for all c, d ∈ C0, if c =0 d and c ∈ C(w), then d ∈ C(w). (=0) /∈ C.
Let the ‘primary game’ contain the following ‘primary rules’ of assertion for sen-
tences of A \ E ; we include these rules among the internal rules:
\ (A ∧B) :⇒ \A and \B
\ (A ∨B) :⇒ \A or \B
\¬A :⇒ A rejected (see §1)
\∃x ε Cm. A(x) :⇒ for some c : \ c ∈ Cm(x), \ A(c)
\ c ε d :⇒ \ d /∈ C0
\ c ε {x ε Cm : A(x)} :⇒ \ c ∈ Cm, \ A(c),
for R(ν) 
 (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : A(x, µ, z))(ν) ∈ T :
\ (c, k) ε R(l) :⇒ \ (c) ∈ Cm, \ k < l, \A((c), k, R(k))
\ a ε R(l) :⇒ \ a ∈ Cm × Ω
\ ∃x ε b(x). A(x) :⇒ for some c ∈ C : \ c ε b(c), \ A(c)
\ ∃x ε pim((c1, . . . , cj), i). A(x) :⇒ \ ci ∈ Cm(x), \ A(ci) (if i ≤ j)
\ ∃x ε pim((c1, . . . , cj), i). A(x) :⇒ \⊥ (if i > j)
\∃x ε pim(s, p). A(x) :⇒ \⊥ (if W(s, p) = {x} )
\ c =0 d :⇒ \ c, d ∈ C0
\ c ε Cjm :⇒ \ c ∈ Cjm.
Assertions of ‘auxiliary sentences’ of the forms c ∈ Cm(x), d /∈ C0, c ∈ Cm, a ∈ Cm × Ω,
and c ∈ Cjm ought, of course, to be justified additionally. - Assertions of sentences of A
are not to be restricted besides.
To see that the primary rules for sentences of A\E can be inverted we shall prove that
all sentences of A are non-circular in the following sense.
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Definitions: A sentence C (∈ A) is said to be a predecessor of D iff C is deducible
from D by at least one application of the following rules (where ⇒ again indicates the
deduction steps):
A ∧B ⇒ A, B (two rules)
A ∨B ⇒ A, B (two rules)
¬A ⇒ A
∃x ε Cm. A(x) ⇒ A(c), if c ∈ Cm(x)
c ε {x ε Cm : A(x)} ⇒ A(c), if c ∈ Cm,
for R(ν) 
 (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : A(x, µ, z))(ν) ∈ T :
(c, k) ε R(l) ⇒ A((c), k, R(k)), if (c) ∈ Cm and k < l,
for terms b(x) of the form {y ε Cm : G} or (Jy ε Cm, µ, z : G)(l):
∃x ε b(x). A(x) ⇒ c ε b(c), A(c), if c ∈ Cm
∃x ε pim((c1, . . . , cj), i). A(x) ⇒ A(ci), if i ≤ j.
In every instance of any of these rules the conclusion is said to be an immediate pre-
decessor of the premise, iff the conditions quoted behind the word “if” are satisfied.
Sentences that do not occur as premises of the just mentioned rules have no predeces-
sors. So sentences that belong E or have the form c ε Cjm have no immedate predecessors.
A sentence of A is said to be non-circular iff it is not a predecessor of itself.
For the announced proof that all sentences are non-circular we need some preliminaries.
At first we define
Tn(w) 


T (w) for w ∈ V0
Tn for w ∈ V
T n for w ∈ V.
8.1. Lemma: For all w, y ∈ W we have
s ∈ Tn(y), r ∈ Tn(w) → swr ∈ Tn(y);
F ∈ Fn, r ∈ Tn(w) → Fwr ∈ Fn.
Regard that T (Ω), T (IN+) ∈ {T (y) : y ∈ V0}.
Proof: At first let y ∈ V0, and s ∈ T (y). This means that if x is a list of all distinct
elements of V(s), and a ∈ C(x), then sxa ∈ C(y). Let w ∈ V0(s) (otherwise swr ≡ s) and
r ∈ T (w). Let z be a list of all distinct elements of V0(swr ), and let u be z without w.
Then for all c ∈ C(z), by setting r◦ 
 rzc and b 
 u zc , we have r◦ ∈ C(w) and hence
(swr )
z
c ≡ sw, ur◦,b ∈ C(y). So swr ∈ T (y). -
Now let y ∈ V ∪ V. We prove 8.1 in this case by induction on the T ,F-rules (i.e. on
the number of steps of construction by the T ,F-rules): Let r ∈ Tn(w), and let ∗ denote
the substitution of r for w. We write “I.H.” for “induction hypothesis”. - For arbitrary
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elements Φ of Tn ∪ T n ∪ Fn we conclude Φ∗ ∈ Tn ∪ T n ∪ Fn from the
I.H.: s∗ ∈ Tn/ s∗ ∈ T n/ F ∗ ∈ Fn, respectively, holds for all terms s and formulas F
for which a previous deduction of (s ∈ Tn) / (s ∈ T n) / (F ∈ Fn) by the
T ,F-rules is required for a deduction of (Φ ∈ Tn), (Φ ∈ T n) or (Φ ∈ Fn).
. Let Φ ∈ Tor ⊂ Tn. If w ∈ V0 then r ∈ T (w), so that (by P1) Φ∗ ∈ Tor.
If w /∈ V0 then w does not occur in Φ; therefore, Φ∗ ≡ Φ ∈ Tn.
. Let Φ ≡ z ∈ V ⊂ Tn. If w ≡ z then z∗ ≡ r ∈ Tn(w) = Tn.
If w 6≡ z then z∗ ≡ z ∈ Tn.
. Let Φ ≡ (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F )(q) ∈ Tn. So F ∈ Fn,m < n, and so (by I.H.) F ∗ ∈ Fn.
If w /∈ {x, µ, z} then Φ∗ ≡ (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F ∗)(q∗) ∈ Tn (since q∗ ∈ T (Ω)).
If w ∈ {x, µ, z} then Φ∗ ≡ (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F )(q∗), thus again Φ∗ ∈ Tn.
. Let Φ ≡ (s1, . . . , sj) ∈ T n. Then s1, . . . , sj ∈ Tn. So (by I.H.) s∗1, . . . , s∗j ∈ Tn, and
so Φ∗ ≡ (s∗1, . . . , s∗j ) ∈ T n.
The remaining steps of induction can be performed analogously. 
Definitions: For Φ ∈ T ∪ T ∪ Fand n > 0 we define:
Anc 
 set of all non-circular sentences.
∗ ∈ Sn(Φ) 
 ∗ is a substitution of all variables w ∈ W(Φ)
by constants w∗ ∈ Cn(w) and satisfies
∀w ∈ V(Φ). ∀ a ∈ Cn. (a ε w∗) ∈ Anc
F ∈ Fncn 
 ∀ ∗ ∈ Sn(F ). F ∗ ∈ Anc.
Remark: ‘∗ ∈ S0(Φ)’ has been defined on p.32. - We have:
s ∈ Tn, ∗ ∈ Sn(s) → s∗ ∈ Cn.
s ∈ T n, ∗ ∈ Sn(s) → s∗ ∈ Cn.
F ∈ Fn, ∗ ∈ Sn(F ) → F ∗ ∈ An (by 8.1).
Definition: Let t(xc )∗ be the term that results from t by replacing all free occurrences of x
by c, and applying the substitution ∗ thereafter. Let (xc )∗ be the corresponding compound
substitution.
8.2. Lemma: (a) ∗ ∈ Sn(∃x ε Cm. F ), c ∈ Cm(x), Fm ⊆ Fncm , m < n → (xc )∗ ∈ Sn(F ).
(b) ∗ ∈ Sn(∃x ε t. F ), a ∈ Cm(x) → (xa)∗ ∈ Sn(x ε t) ∩ Sn(F ).
Proof: (a) Let ∗ ∈ Sn(∃x ε Cm. F ), c ∈ Cm(x), Fm ⊆ Fncm , m < n, as well as
w ∈ V(F ) with w∗ ∈ Cn, and a ∈ Cn. We have to show that (a ε w(xc )∗) ∈ Anc. If w 6≡ x
then w ∈ V(∃x ε Cm. F ) and hence (a ε w(xc )∗) ≡ (a ε w∗) ∈ Anc. Now let w ≡ x. So
(a ε w(xc )
∗) ≡ (a ε c). If a ∈ Cn\Cm then (a ε c) has no predecessors (since c ∈ Cm), and
hence (a ε c) is non-circular. If a ∈ Cm then (a ε c) ∈ Am ⊆ Anc.
(b) Let ∗ ∈ Sn(∃x ε t. F ), a ∈ Cm(x), w ∈ V(x ε t) ∪ V(F ) with w∗ ∈ Cn, and a ∈ Cn.
We have to show that (a ε w(xa)∗) ∈ Anc. Because of w ∈ V we have w 6≡ x, hence
w ∈ V(∃x ε t. F ), and hence (a ε w(xa)∗) ≡ (a ε w∗) ∈ Anc.
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8.3. Theorem: All sentences of A are non-circular.
Proof: By ‘composite induction’ we show that Fn ⊆ Fncn for all n ∈ Ω: We start from
the induction hypothesis
I.H.1: Fm ⊆ Fncm for all m < n.
From this we conclude Fn ⊆ Fncn by induction on the T ,F-rules. To this end, for any
formula H ∈ Fn we infer H ∈ Fncn from I.H.1 and the further hypothesis
I.H.2: F ∈ Fncn for all formulas F such that the deduction of (H ∈ Fn) by
the T ,F-rules requires a previous deduction of (F ∈ Fn) by those rules.
Let H ∈ Fn and ∗ ∈ Sn(H). We have to show that H∗ is non-circular. To this end it
suffices to show that all immediate predecessors of H∗ are non-circular.
. If H ∈ E or H ≡ (s ε Cpq ), then H∗ has no immedate predecessor (∈ A). So H∗ ∈ Anc.
. Let H ∈ {(F ∧G), (F ∨G)} with F,G ∈ Fn. By I.H.2 we have F,G ∈ Fncn , and so
F ∗, G∗ ∈ Anc.
. For H ≡ (¬F ) we can conclude similarly.
. Let H ≡ (∃x ε Cm. F ) with m < n and F ∈ Fn. By I.H.2, F ∈ Fncn . Every immediate
predecessor of H∗ has the form F (xc )∗ with c ∈ Cm(x) and is, therefore, non-circular
(since (xc )∗ ∈ Sn(F ) holds by 8.2 and I.H.1).
. Let H ≡ (s ε t) with s ∈ T n, t ∈ Tn. By 8.1, s∗ ∈ Cn.
Case 1: Let t ∈ Tor. Then t∗ ∈ C0. So H∗ ≡ (s∗ ε t∗) has no predecessors.
Case 2: Let t ∈ V. Because of ∗ ∈ Sn(H) and s∗ ∈ Cn we have H∗ ≡ (s∗ ε t∗) ∈ Anc.
Case 3: t ≡ R(q) with R ≡ (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F ), F ∈ Fn and m < n. By I.H.2, F ∈
Fncn . Let F ≡ A(x, µ, z). H∗ ≡ s∗ ε t∗ has the form (a, k) ε R(l), which has the
immediate predecessor A((a), k, R(k)) iff k < l. Now we suppose that, for all k < l and
all (a, h) ∈ Cm × Ω, we have ((a, h) ε R(k)) ∈ Anc, which implies ( x, µ, z(a),k,R(k))∗ ∈ Sn(F )
(since x, µ /∈ V), A((a), k, R(k)) ≡ F ( x, µ, z(a),k,R(k))∗ ∈ Anc (since F ∈ Fncn ), and hence
((a, k) ε R(l)) ∈ Anc. By induction on Ω we obtain especially H∗ ≡ (s∗ ε R(q∗)) ∈ Anc.
The residual case 4: t ≡ {x ε Cm : F} can even be treated simpler.
. Let H ≡ (∃x ε t. F ) with t ∈ Tn and F ∈ Fn. By I.H.2, F ∈ Fncn . As in the case
“H ≡ (s ε t)” we also obtain (x ε t) ∈ Fncn . Every immediate predecessor of H∗ has the
form (x ε t)(xa)∗ ≡ (a ε t(xa)∗) or F (xa)∗ with a ∈ Cm where t(xa)∗ has the form {y ε Cm . . .}
or (Jy ε Cm . . .)(l). If x /∈ V(t) then t(xa)∗ ≡ t∗ ∈ Cn, so that m < n. If x ∈ V(t), then
t /∈ T0, hence t (∈ Tn) has the indicated form, and hencem < n, again. Therefore, in every
case, a ∈ Cn. So (a ∈ t(xa)∗) is non-circular (since (x ε t) ∈ Fncn and (xa)∗ ∈ Sn(x ∈ t)
by 8.2). Also F (xa)∗ is non-circular (since F ∈ Fncn and (xa)∗ ∈ Sn(F ) by 8.2). Hence all
immediate predecessors of H∗ are non-circular.
. For H ≡ (∃x ε pim(s, p). F ) we can argue as in the above case “H ≡ (∃x ε Cm. F )”.
We have shown that Fn ⊆ Fncn for all n ∈ Ω. It follows especially that all sentences
are non-circular.  - By 8.3 and the results of §2 and §3 we obtain:
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8.3*. Corollary: All primary rules for sentences of A \ E can be inverted. So we may
argue classically with sentences of A in the classical game.
Now we repeat some former definitions, define an equivalence relation (=) on C, and
show that all terms and formulas are invariant under that relation.
Definitions: For x ∈ W and s, t ∈ T we define:
∀x ε Cn. F 
 ¬∃x ε Cn.¬F
∃wF 
 ∃w ε C0. F (if w ∈ V0)
∀wF 
 ∀w ε C0. F (if w ∈ V0)
∀x ε s. F 
 ¬∃x ε s.¬F
s ε Cq 
 (s) ε C1q
s ⊆ t 
 ∀x ε s. x ε t ∧ ¬ (s ε C0) ∧ ¬ (t ε C0)
s ∼ t 
 ∀µ (s ε Cµ ↔ t ε Cµ)
s = t 
 s =0 t ∨ (s ⊆ t ∧ t ⊆ s ∧ s ∼ t)
s =n t 
 s = t ∧ s ε Cn ∧ t ε Cn (for n > 0)
s ε t 
 (s) ε t.
In the definitions of (s ⊆ t) and (s ∼ t) let the variables x and µ not occur in s or t. -
Because of c = d→ c ∼ d we obtain:
8.4. Lemma: c ε Cm ∧ c = d → c =m d.
Definition: For s, t ∈ T we define by means of variables x, y, z ∈ V \ V(s, t) and κ for
elements of IN+:
s ε Cm 
 s ε {x ε Cm : 0 = 0}
s =m t 
 s ε Cm ∧ t ε Cm ∧
∧ ∀κ ∀x ε Cm. [∃y ε pim(s, κ). x = y ↔ ∃z ε pim(t, κ). x = z ].
8.5. Lemma: If a ≡ (a1, . . . , aj), b ≡ (b1, . . . , bk) then
a =m b ↔ j = k ∧ a1 =m b1 ∧ . . . ∧ aj =m bj .
Proof: We now write A as short for (a ε Cm ∧ b ε Cm) und use i as a metavariable
for elements of IN+. Then we have
a =m b ↔ A ∧ ∀ i ∀x ε Cm. [ ∃y ε pim(a, i). x = y ↔ ∃z ε pim(b, i). x = z ]
↔ A ∧ ∀ i ∀x ε Cm. [ i ≤ j ∧ x = ai ↔ i ≤ k ∧ x = bi ]
↔ j = k ∧ ∀ i ≤ j. ai =m bi. 
Definition: For s ∈ T , s ε Cm 
 s ε {x ε Cm : 0 = 0}.
Remark: For all c ∈ C : c ε Cm ↔ c ∈ Cm.
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8.6. Lemma: c = d → (c ε Cm ↔ d ε Cm). (Proof: 8.4, 8.5. )
Definitions: For Φ ∈ T ∪ T ∪ F , let |Φ| be the least n ∈ Ω with Φ ∈ Tn ∪ T n ∪ Fn.
Moreover, for w ∈ W we define: C(w) 
 ⋃n∈Ω Cn(w).
8.7. Lemma: If Φ ∈ T ∪ T ∪ F , w ∈ W(Φ), and c ∈ C(w), then |Φwc | = max{|Φ|, |c|}.
Proof by induction on the construction of Φ by the T ,F-rules: To this we give only
some induction steps as examples. Let Φ ∈ T ∪ T ∪ F , w ∈ W(Φ), and c ∈ C(w). We
write m+ 1 for m′; ∗ for the substitution wc , and “I.H.” for “induction hypothesis”.
. Let Φ ≡ (s ε Cpq ). Then |Φ| = |s|. By 8.1, p∗ ∈ T (IN+), q∗ ∈ T (Ω), and so Φ∗ ∈ F .
If w ∈ W(s) then (by I.H.): |s∗| = max{|s|, |c|}, and so |Φ∗| = |(s∗ ε Cp∗q∗ )| = |s∗| =
max{|s|, |c|} = max{|Φ|, |c|}. If w /∈ W(s) then w ∈ V0(p) ∪ V0(q), so c ∈ C(w) ⊂
C0, |c| = 0, and so |Φ∗| = |(s ε Cp
∗
q∗ )| = |s| = |Φ| = max{|Φ|, |c|}.
. Let Φ ≡ (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F )(q) ∈ T . Then |Φ| = max{m + 1, |F |}. If w ∈ {x, µ, z}
then w ∈ V0(q), so again |c| = 0, moreover Φ∗ ≡ (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F )(q∗), and so
|Φ∗| = max{m + 1, |F |} = |Φ| = max{|Φ|, |c|}. In case w /∈ W(F ) we may conclude in
the same way. Now let w /∈ {x, µ, z} and w ∈ W(F ). Then Φ∗ ≡ (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F ∗)(q∗),
and by I.H.: |F ∗| = max{|F |, |c|}. So we also obtain
|Φ∗| = max{m+ 1, |F ∗|} = max{m+ 1, |F |, |c|} = max{|Φ|, |c|}.
. Let Φ ≡ (∃x ε pim(s, p). F ) with s ∈ T , p ∈ T (IN+) und F ∈ F . Then |Φ| =
max{m+ 1, |s|, |F |}. Because of w ∈ W(Φ) we have w 6≡ x. Again we have p∗ ∈ T (IN+)
and so Φ∗ ≡ (∃x ε pim(s∗, p∗). F ∗) ∈ F . If w ∈ W(s) ∪W(F ) then
|Φ∗| = max{m+ 1, |s∗|, |F ∗|} =I.H. max{m+ 1, |s|, |F |, |c|} = max{|Φ|, |c|}.
If w /∈ W(s) ∪W(F ) then w ∈ V0(p), so again |c| = 0 and thus
|Φ∗| = |∃x ε pim(s, p∗). F | = max{m+ 1, |s|, |F |} = |Φ| = max{|Φ|, |c|}. -
The remaining steps of induction can be performed analogously.  -
From 8.7 we obtain:
8.8. Corollary: If s ∈ T ∪ T , W(s) = {w}, and c, d ∈ C(w) then: c ∼ d → swc ∼ swd .
Definitions:
∃x ε Cm. F 
 ∃x ε {x ε Cm : 0 = 0}. F
∀x ε Cm. F 
 ¬∃x ε Cm.¬F.
Let In denote the set of all elements a of Cn for which the formula (x ε a) is invariant
under (=n). Accordingly, for a, b ∈ C we define:
a ε In 
 a ε Cn ∧ ∀x ε Cn. ∀y ε Cn. [x =n y → (x ε a ↔ y ε a) ]
a =¨n b 
 a =n b ∧ a ε In ∧ b ε In.
So we especially have: a ε I0 ↔ a ε C0, and a=¨0b ↔ a =0 b. - For a ≡ (a1, . . . , aj) and
b ≡ (b1, . . . , bj) define
a =¨n b 
 a1 =¨n b1 ∧ . . . ∧ aj =¨n bj .
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8.9. Lemma: If all elements of Fm are invariant under (=m), then for all
a, b ∈ Cm ∪ Cm : a =n b → a =¨n b.
Proof: Let a ∈ Cm. Then the formula (x ε a) is a member of Fm and therefore, by
hypothesis, invariant under (=m). So a ε Im. Moreover, we have
∀x ε Cn (x ε a → x ε Cm). By 8.4 (with x, y in place of c, d) it follows that
∀x ε Cn. ∀y ε Cn. [x =n y → (x ε a ↔ x ε a ∧ x =m y ↔
↔ y ε a ∧ x =m y ↔ y ε a) ].
So a ε In. From this we obtain 8.9 for a, b ∈ Cm and so, by 8.5, also for a, b ∈ Cm. 
8.10. Theorem: All elements of Tn ∪ T n ∪ Fn are invariant under (=n).
Proof by compound induction: We start from the hypothesis
I.H.1: For all m < n, all elements of Tm ∪ T m ∪ Fm are invariant under (=m).
From this we conclude at first : All elements of Tn ∪ T n ∪ Fn are invariant under (=¨n).
To this end, we consider any element Φ ∈ Tn ∪ T n ∪ Fn and infer from I.H.1 and the
following hypothesis I.H.2 that Φ is invariant under (=¨n):
I.H.2: Invariant under (=¨n) are all terms and formulas that must have been shown to be
elements of Tn ∪ T n ∪ Fn in order to show (by the T ,F-rules) that Φ is an element of
Tn ∪ T n ∪ Fn.
So we suppose that Φ ∈ Tn ∪T n ∪Fn and W(Φ) = {w} with w 
 w1, . . . , wj . Moreover,
let c, d ∈ C(w) and c =¨n d. We consider the substitutions ∗ 
 wc und † 
 wd , and write
“invariant” as short for “invariant under (=¨n)”.
. Let Φ ≡ s ∈ Tor. In s occur only variables wi of V0. So we have ci, di ∈ C0. Because of
ci =n di it follows (by 8.4) that ci =0 di, so (by the hypothesis on (=0)): s∗ =0 s†, s∗, s† ∈
C0, and so s∗, s† ε In, too.
. Let Φ ≡ w1 ∈ V ∪ V. Then Φ∗ ≡ c1 and Φ† ≡ d1. Since c1 =¨n d1 we have Φ∗ =¨n Φ†.
. Let Φ ≡ R(q) ≡ (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F )(q) ∈ Tn with m < n and F ∈ Fn. F is invariant by
I.H.2. Let F ≡ A(x, µ, z, w). We want to prove R∗(l) =¨nR†(l) for all l ∈ Ω by induction
on Ω. To this end we may use the (third) induction hypothesis that for all k < l we have
R∗(k) =¨nR†(k). Then for all a, b with a =n b we obtain by 8.6, 8.9 and I.H.1:
(a) ε Cm → (b) ε Cm → a =¨n b. So (by 8.6) for all k ∈ Ω:
(a, k) ε R∗(l) ↔ (a) ε Cm ∧ k < l ∧ A((a), k, R∗(k), c)
↔ (b) ε Cm ∧ k < l ∧ A((b), k, R†(k), d) ↔ (b, k) ε R†(l).
From this it follows, by 8.8, that R∗(l), R†(l) ε In and hence R∗(l) =¨nR†(l). This result
holds for all l ∈ Ω. So we obtain especially R∗(q∗) =¨nR†(q†), i.e. Φ∗ =¨n Φ†.
. The case Φ ≡ {x ε Cm : F} can even be treated simpler.
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. Let Φ ≡ (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ T n. By I.H.2 we have s∗i =¨n s†i . So Φ∗ =¨n Φ†.
. Let Φ ≡ E ∈ E . As in the case “Φ ≡ s ∈ Tor” we obtain ci =0 di, and so: E∗ ↔ E†.
. Let Φ ∈ {(F ∧G), (F ∨G), (¬F ), (∃x ε Cm. F )} with invariant formulas F,G ∈ Fn,
and m < n. Then it easily follows that also Φ is invariant. Concerning the formula
(∃x ε Cm. F ) regard that, by I.H.1 and 8.9, we have: a ε Cm → a =¨n a.
. Let Φ ≡ (s ε t) where s ∈ T n and t ∈ Tn are invariant. So we have s∗ =n s†, t∗ ε In
and t∗ =n t†. It follows that: s∗ ε t∗ ↔ s† ε t∗ ↔ s† ε t†.
. Let Φ ≡ (∃x ε t. F ) where t ∈ Tn, F ∈ Fn are invariant. First let x ∈ V(t∗). For all
a ∈ C with a ε t(xa)∗ we have |a| < |t(xa)∗| = max{|t∗|, |a|} (by 8.7), so |a| < |t∗| ≤ n.
This also holds for x /∈ V(t∗). So in any case, by I.H.1 and 8.9: a ε t(xa)∗ → a =¨n a →
t(xa)
∗ =¨n t(xa)†. So: a ε t(xa)∗ ∧ F (xa)∗ → a ε t(xa)† ∧ F (xa)†. So we obtain: Φ∗ → Φ†
and, in the same way: Φ† → Φ∗.
. Let Φ ≡ (∃x ε pim(s, p). F ) where s ∈ T n, p ∈ T (IN+), and F ∈ Fn, which are
invariant. At first let x ∈ W \W(s, p). Then s∗, s† are constants, p∗, p† ∈ IN+, s∗ =¨n s†
and p∗ ≡ p†. Let s∗ ≡ (a1, . . . , aj), s† ≡ (b1, . . . , bj), and i 
 p∗. In case i ≤ j we
have ai =¨n bi, and hence Φ∗ ↔ F (xai)∗ ↔ F (xbi)† ↔ Φ†. In case i > j we have:
Φ∗ ↔ ⊥ ↔ Φ†. Finally, let x ∈ W(s, p). Then x ∈ W(s∗, p∗)∩W(s†, p†), so that again:
Φ∗ ↔ ⊥ ↔ Φ†.
. Let Φ ≡ (s ε Cpq ) with an invariant term s ∈ T n. Since s∗ ∼ s†, p∗ ≡ p† and q∗ ≡ q†
we have: s∗ ε Cp
∗
q∗ ↔ s† ε Cp
∗
q∗ ↔ s† ε Cp
†
q† .
. Let Φ ≡ (s =0 t) with invariant s, t ∈ Tn. Then Φ∗ → s∗ ε C0 ∧ t∗ ε C0, so
Φ∗ → s† =0 s∗ =0 t∗ =0 t† → Φ†, and likewise: Φ† → Φ∗.
On the assumption I.H.1 we have shown that all elements of Tn ∪ Fn are invariant
under (=¨n). Now we consider any element c ∈ Cn. All ‘elements’ a, b of c (if there are
any) have a lower order than n, so that (by I.H.1 and 8.9): a =n b → a =¨n b. Since the
formula (x ε c) belongs to Fn, it is invariant under (=¨n) and so under (=n). Therefore,
c ε In. For all c, d ∈ Cn we obtain: c =n d ↔ c =¨n d. So all elements of Tn ∪ Fn are
invariant under (=n). 
Definition:
(s1, . . . , sj) = (t1, . . . , tj) 
 s1 = t1 ∧ . . . ∧ sj = tj
(s1, . . . , sj) = (t1, . . . , tk) 
 ⊥ if j 6= k.
It seems not to be possible to adequately define (x = y), (x = (t1, . . . , tj)), and ((s1, . . . , sj) =
y) as formulas of F . Nevertheless, we obtain:
8.11. Corollary: All elements of T ∪ T ∪ F are invariant under (=).
Proof, for formulas, e.g.: Let F ∈ F , {w} = W(F ), (c), (d) ∈ C(w) and c = d.
Then there exist k,m ∈ Ω such that F ∈ Fk and c =m d. Let n 
 max{k,m}. Then
F ∈ Fn, c =n d, and so (Fwc ↔ Fwd ) (by 8.10). 
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By 8.3 and 8.11 we have solved our main tasks mentioned in §7.
Definitions of j-ary relations: For x ≡ x1, . . . , xj and y /∈ V(F ),
∃x ε Cm. F 
 ∃x1 ε Cm . . . ∃xj ε Cm. F
{x ε Cm : F} 
 {y ε Cm : ∃x ε Cm. (y =m (x) ∧ F )}
(Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F ) 
 (Jy ε Cm, µ, z : ∃x ε Cm. (y =m (x) ∧ F )}.
So we have
(c) ε {x ε Cm : A(x)} ↔ (c) ε Cm ∧ A(c),
Similarly, for R
 (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : A(x, µ, z)) we have
(c, k) ε R(l) ↔ (c) ε Cm ∧ k < l ∧ A(c, k,R(k)).
Now we can prove the following Corollary by which we can ‘define’ sequences of relations
S(k), k ∈ IN, by ordinary recursion on IN (cf. §4: Addition in IN).
8.12. Corollary: For any two formulas A(x), B(x, µ, z) ∈ Fn with x ∈ W, z ∈ V, and
m < n there exists a term S(ν) ∈ Tn such that for all (c) ∈ C and all k ∈ IN,
(c) ε S(0) ↔ (c) ε Cm ∧ A(c)
(c) ε S(k′) ↔ (c) ε Cm ∧ B(c, k, S(k)).
Proof: Let
D(x, µ, z) 

[
µ = 0 ∧ A(x) ] ∨
∨ ∃λ [µ = λ′ ∧ B(x, λ, {x ε Cm : (x, λ) ε z}) ]
R(k) 
 (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : D(x, µ, z))(k)
S(k) 
 {x ε Cm : (x, k) ε R(k′)}.
Then we have
(c) ε S(0) ↔ (c, 0) ε R(0′) ↔ (c) ε Cm ∧ A(c)
(c) ε S(k′) ↔ (c, k′) ε R(k′′) ↔ (c) ε Cm ∧ B(c, k, S(k)). 
§9. ι-terms (definite description terms)
In this section we introduce ‘ι-terms’, i.e. terms of the form (ι y ε Ck.Φy) [ “the (unique)
element y of Ck that satisfies Φy ” ] (where Φy is a ‘proper’ formula). Then, for instance,
the notation of function application can be defined by f(x) 
 (ιy ε Ck. (x, y) ε f).
Definitions: We shall use these abbreviations (for formulas Φy and variables u not
occurring in them and satisfying C(u) = C(y)):
Φ(= u) 
 ∀y ε Ck (Φy ↔ y = u)
ϕ 
 ιy ε Ck.Φy
ψ 
 ιz ε C`.Ψz.
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ϕ is said to be a proper ι-term iff every instance of ∃u ε Ck.Φ(= u) holds (which means
that there is a unique y ε Ck satisfying Φy).
ϕ is said to be prime iff no other ι-term occurs in ϕ.
All occurrences of the variable y in ϕ are said to be bound.
A ι-term without free occurring variables is said to be a ι-constant (or a definite descrip-
tion).
In the following we adapt well-known introductions of ι-terms (as in [7, §9] or [9,
pp. 170f.]) to higher order languages. To this end, terms and formulas are permitted to
contain proper ι-terms. We spezify this thus: In the T ,F-rules adduced in §8 (by which
terms and formulas are to be constructed) we now write T ιn ,F ιn, etc. instead of Tn,Fn,
etc., and we complete those rules by this rule:
Φu ∈ F ιn ⇒ ϕ ∈ T ιn , if k < n and ϕ is proper.
The words “term” / “formula” are to be understood as elements of T ι / F ι, respectively.
However, all constants c referred to in the following rules are supposed to be ι-free, i.e.
not to contain ι-terms:
\∃x ε Cm. A(x) :⇒ for some c : \ c ∈ Cm, \ A(c)
\∃x ε b(x). A(x) :⇒ for some c : \ c ε b(c), \ A(c).
We say that ϕ occurs free in a formula F iff ϕ occurs in F and every free occurrence
of a variable in ϕ is also free in F .
For formulas F ∈ F ι let the reduction ∗F of F be recursively defined thus:
∗F 
 F, if no ι-term occurs free in F .
∗Fϕ 
 ∃y ε Ck. (Φy ∧ ∗Fy), if (1) is satisfied:
(1) Fϕ 
 (Fy)yϕ, ϕ is a prime and proper ι-term that is free for y in Fy and does
not occur in Fy, and some occurrence of ϕ in Fϕ begins on the left of all other free
occurrences of a prime and proper ι-terms in Fϕ.
Presupposition: In the following, ϕ and ψ are proper ι-constants as above.
A, Aϕ, Bψ etc. are sentences of Aι and contain proper ι-terms only.
Now we accept all primary rules fixed in §8 for sentences of A in which no ι-constant
occurs, and we fix this rule, in addition:
R(ι) : A :⇒ ∗A, if some ι-constant occurs.
Let assertions of sentences containing ι-constants not be restricted by other rules.
So the inverse of R(ι) is classically admissible.
Notes: 1. The use of Aϕ∧Bϕ, e.g., is ruled by R(ι) and its inverse. However, due to 9.2
(below) we may also apply the rules Aϕ∧Bϕ⇔ Aϕ,Bϕ. So Aϕ∧Bϕ may be used like
a common conjunction.
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2. Assume that Ey ∈ E , ϕ is prime, and y is the only variable occurring free in Φy ∧Ey.
Then we have y ∈ V0, hence C(y) ⊆ C0, and hence
∃y ε Ck. (Φy ∧ Ey) ↔ ∃y ε C0. (Φy ∧ Ey).
In the following we write A ⇒ B / A ⇔ B to express that these rules are classically
admissible.
9.1 Lemma: If Aψ 
 (Az)zψ and ψ is prime, then
Aψ ⇔ ∃z ε C`. (Ψz ∧ ∗Az).
So ∃z ε C`.Ψz implies ψ ε C` and Ψψ.
Proof: If ϕ satisfies (1), we obtain
Aϕ ⇔ ∗Aϕ ⇔ ∃y ∈ Ck. (Φy ∧ ∗Ay)
by R(ι) and its inverse. Now let ϕ and ψ be prime and occur in A(ϕ,ψ) where ϕ satisfies
(1). We prove
A(ϕ,ψ)⇔ ∃z ε C`. (Ψz ∧ ∗A(ϕ, z))
by induction on the number of ι-constants occurring in A(., ψ) (with ‘I.H.’ for ‘induction
hypothesis’).
A(ϕ,ψ) ⇔ ∃y ε Ck. (Φy ∧ ∗A(y, ψ)) (as above)
⇔ ∃y ε Ck. (Φy ∧ ∃z ε C`. (Ψz ∧ ∗A(y, z))) (by I.H.)
⇔ ∃z ε C`. (Ψz ∧ ∃y ε Ck. (Φy ∧ ∗A(y, z)))
⇔ ∃z ε C`. (Ψz ∧ ∗A(ϕ, z)). 
9.2 Proposition (by which we may argue in Aι in the same way as in A and may apply
classical logic; cf. Note 1 above): For sentences of Aι we have:
A ◦B ⇔ ∗A ◦ ∗B if ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}
¬A ⇔ ¬ ∗A
∃x ε Cm. A(x) ⇔ ∃x ε Cm. ∗A(x))
∃z ε C`. (Ψz ∧Az) ⇔ ∃z ε C`. (∗Ψz ∧ ∗Az)
For b(x) ≡ {y ε Cm. B(x, y)} or b(x) ≡ (Jy ε Cm, µ, z : . . .)(l):
∃x ε b(x). A(x) ⇔ ∃x ε Cm. ∗ (x ε b(x) ∧A(x))
c ε {x ε Cm : A(x)} ⇔ c ε Cm ∧A(c)
∃x ε pim((c1, . . . , cj), i).A(x) ⇔ ci ε Cm ∧A(ci) (for i = 1, . . . , j).
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For R
 (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : A(x, µ, z)), i, j ∈ Ωι:
(c, i) ε R(j) ⇔ (c) ε Cm ∧ i < j ∧A((c), i, R(i)).
Proof: Let ϕ be prime, and let u be a variable that is free for y in Φy ∧Dy and does
not occur in Φy ∧Dy.
ASSUMPTION: u ∈ Ck ∧ Φu.
This assumption and Dϕ⇔ ∃y ε Ck. (Φy ∧ ∗Dy) (cf. 9.1) imply
Dϕ⇒ ∃y ∈ Ck. (u = y ∧ ∗Dy)⇒ ∗Du⇒ ∃y ε Ck. (Φy ∧ ∗Dy)⇒ Dϕ,
and hence ∗Dϕ ⇔ Dϕ ⇔ ∗Du ⇔ Du.
In the following we apply induction on the number of ι-constants occurring in the formulas
considered. For instance, we use the induction hypothesis (I.H.) Au ◦Bu ⇔ ∗Au ◦ ∗Bu
to show that Aϕ ◦Bϕ ⇔ ∗Aϕ ◦ ∗Bϕ. Here we assume that ϕ occurs in Aϕ ◦Bϕ.
Aϕ ◦Bϕ ⇔ Au ◦Bu ⇔I.H. ∗Au ◦ ∗Bu ⇔ ∗Aϕ ◦ ∗Bϕ
¬Aϕ ⇔ ¬Au ⇔I.H. ¬ ∗Au ⇔ ¬ ∗Aϕ
∃x ε Cm. A(x, ϕ) ⇔ ∃x ε Cm. A(x, u) ⇔I.H. ∃x ε Cm. ∗A(x, u)
⇔ ∃x ε Cm. ∗A(x, ϕ)
c(ϕ) ε {x ε Cm. A(ϕ, x)} ⇔ c(u) ε {x ε Cm. A(u, x)}
⇔ c(u) ε Cm ∧A(u, c(u)) (I.H.)
⇔ c(ϕ) ε Cm ∧A(ϕ, c(ϕ)).
The remainder can be proved similarly. 
9.3 Corollary: If A⇒ B, then A→ B.
Proof: Assume that A⇒ B. Then, by R(ι) and its inverse, we obtain ∗A⇒ ∗B, hence
∗A→ ∗B, and hence (by 9.2) A→ B. 
Now we omit the assumption of 9.1 that ψ is prime:
9.4 Proposition: We have
Aψ ↔ ∃z ε C`. (Ψz ∧Az)
↔ ∀z ε C`. (Ψz → Az), hence
∀z ε C`. Az → Aϕ → ∃z ε C`.Az, moreover
A(ψ,ψ)) ↔ ∃z ε C`. (Ψz ∧A(z, ψ)).
So proper ι-terms may be used like ordinary terms in the scope of nice formulas.
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Proof: If ψ is prime, we have ∗Aψ ⇔ ∃z ε C`. (∗Ψz ∧∗Az) by 9.1. Now let ϕ be prime,
and let ψ(ϕ) be a proper ι-constant containing ϕ. Since in ψ(y) occur fewer ι-constants
than in ψ(ϕ), we may assume that
∀y ∈ Ck. (∗A(ψ(y))⇔ ∃z ∈ C`. (∗Ψ(y, z) ∧ ∗A(z))).
This implies:
∗Aψ(ϕ) ⇔ ∃y ∈ Ck. (Φy ∧ ∗Aψ(y))
⇔ ∃y ∈ Ck. (Φy ∧ ∃z ∈ C`. (∗Ψ(y, z) ∧ ∗Az))
⇔ ∃z ∈ C`.∃y ∈ Ck. (Φy ∧ ∗Ψ(y, z) ∧ ∗Az)
⇔ ∃z ∈ C`. (∗Ψ(ϕ, z) ∧ ∗Az).
So, for all proper ψ,
∗Aψ ⇔ ∃z ε C`. (∗Ψz ∧ ∗Az)
⇒ ∃z ε C`. ∀y ε C`. (∗Ψy → y = z → ∗Ay)
⇒ ∀y ε C`. (∗Ψy → ∗Ay)
⇒ ∃z ε C`. (∗Ψz ∧ ∗Az) (since ∃z ε C`. ∗Ψz).
∗A(ψ,ψ) ⇔ ∃z, y ε C`. (∗Ψz ∧ y = z ∧ ∗A(z, y))
⇔ ∃z, y ε C`. (∗Ψz ∧ ∗Ψy ∧ ∗A(z, y))
⇔ ∃z ε C`. (∗Ψz ∧ ∃y ε C`. (∗Ψy ∧ ∗A(z, y))
⇔ ∃z ε C`. (∗Ψz ∧ ∗A(z, ψ)).
By R(ι), its inverse, and 9.2 we may omit ‘∗’ in these results. By 9.3 we may replace ‘⇔’
by ‘↔’. 
Note: Proper ι-terms with free variables can be eliminated as in the following examples
(in which ϕ(x) / ϕ(x), resp., is not free for y on the left):
c ε {x ε Cm : A(x, ϕ(x))} ↔ c ε Cm ∧A(c, ϕ(c))
↔ c ε Cm ∧ ∃y ε Ck. (Φ(c, y) ∧ ∗A(c, y)).
∃x ε Cm. A(x, ϕ(x)) ↔ ∃x ε Cm. ∗A(x, ϕ(x))
↔ ∃x ε Cm. ∃y ∈ Ck. (Φ(x, y) ∧ ∗A(x, y)).
§10. Substitutional combined with objectual quantification
in higher order languages
Here we want to extend our investigations of §5 to higher order languages. To this end
we include certain indicators (“this flower”, e.g.) in Tor and admit that they occur in
other terms of Tor and in formulas of E (cf. p.28), and thus also in higher order terms and
formulas. However, we do not include indicators in V0∪V ∪V (pp. 28, 29). Denotations
of indicators (i.e. of objects by indicators) are to be understood as in §5. A denotation
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α1, . . . , αk (k ≥ 0) is empty or composed of simple denotations αi (i.e. denotations
of single indicators) which are valid in particular situations only. To imitate objectual
quantification by substitutional quantification, we shall also use certain ‘d-names’ of
simple denotations, which can also be considered as proper names of the objects denoted
by those denotations. Such a d-name can be given, e.g., by an indicator, u, the name of
an actor, and the date at which he denotes an object by u. However, we shall sometimes
not explicitely distinguish simple denotations from their d-names.
Compound denotations generally result from acts of naming objects at different places at
different times. However, their d-names can be used anywhere at any time and thus independent
of situations.
Definition: If Φ is a term or a formula or a list of d-names, let I(Φ) be the set of all
distinct indicators occurring in Φ. For single d-names α let Iα be the (unique) indicator
occurring in α.
As metavariables we use here: x, y for variables of V0 ∪ V, x for elements of V, and
α, β, γ, γ′ for lists α1, . . . , αk of d-names with Iαi 6≡ Iαj for all i, j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k
(or corresponding denotations).
If Φ is a formula or a term and α = α1, . . . , αk, then let Φα result from Φ by substitu-
ting the d-name of αi for the indicator occurring in it (i = 1, . . . , k). However, occurrences
of indicators in d-names are to be treated as ‘bound’, i.e. not ‘free’, i.e. they are not to
be replaced by the mentioned substitutions.
For U ∈ ⋃x∈V0{Tor, T (x), E}, we demand that tα ∈ U iff t ∈ U . So by induction on
the T ,F-rules of §8 we obtain: tα ∈ Tn iff t ∈ Tn, and F α ∈ Fn iff F ∈ Fn.
If A is a formula in which no variable occurs free and no d-name occurs, we compactly
write \A|α for the assertion of A ‘under/in α’, i.e. in a situation in which α is valid.
Then we assume that I(A) ⊆ I(α). Now we again accept the rules of assertion quoted in
§8 and fix, in addition, this rule for assertions under denotations:
\A|α :⇒ \A α.
By this rule we want to imitate objectual by substitutional quantification and so to
simplify the theory.
Sentences of the form E α with E ∈ E remind on protocol sentences. However, in many
cases it suffices for practice to ignore the latter rule and to act upon suitable given rules
or usage for elementary assertions \E|α and to apply the rules quoted in 10.1 (below).
Since we do not admit other rules than \A|α :⇒ \A α with \A|α as premise, this
rule may be inverted.
Definitions: Let I be the set of all indicators. (I is assumed to be infinite.)
Let Cm be the set of all elements of Tm in which no elements of V0 ∪V ∪V ∪I occur free.
Let Cm(x) be the set of are values of x belonging to Cm (cf. pp. 31, 33).
Let Cm and C be defined analogously.
47
Let αβ result from the list α, β by canceling all those members βj of β with Iβj ∈ I(α).
We write ‘(b, β)∈Rm(x, α)’ for ‘I(b) ⊆ I(αβ) ∧ bαβ ∈ Cm(x)’,
and ‘(b, β)∈R(α)’ for ‘I(b) ⊆ I(αβ) ∧ bαβ ∈ C’.
We complete the rules fixed in §8 (p.34) by this rule for sentences in which d-names
occur but indicators do not occur free:
\ ∃x ε Cm. A(x) :⇒ for some (b, β)∈Rm(x, α). \ A(b αβ),
if α ist the list of all d-names occurring in A(x).
(For empty α, this rules coincides with a rule fixed in §8.)
10.1 Proposition: In the primary game we may apply the following rules to formulas
in which no elements of V0 ∪ V ∪ V occur free and no d-names occur:
\ (A ∧B)|α ⇔ \A|α and \B|α
\ (A ∨B)|α ⇔ \A|α or \B|α
\¬A|α ⇔ A rejected in α
\ ∃x ε Cm. A(x)|α ⇔ for some (b, β)∈Rm(x, α). \ A(b)|αβ
\ c ε {x ε Cm : A(x)}|α ⇔ \ cα ∈ Cm, \ A(c)|α,
for R
 (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : A(x, µ, z)) and k, l ∈ Ω:
\ (c, k) ε R(l)|α ⇔ \ (c)α ∈ Cm, \ k < l, \A((c), k, R(k))|α
\ ∃x ε c(x). A(x)|α ⇔ for some (b, β)∈R(α). \ (b ε c(b) ∧A(b))|αβ
\ ∃x ε pim((c1, . . . , cj), i). A(x)|α ⇔ \ cαi ∈ Cm(x), \ A(ci)|α (if 1 ≤ i ≤ j)
\ c ε Cjm|α ⇔ \ cα ∈ Cjm
\A(ϕ)|α ⇔ ∃y ε Ck. (Φ(y) ∧A(y))|α,
if ϕ
 ιy ε Ck.Φ(y) is a proper ι-constant, in which indicators may occur.
Note: The above rule for ∃x ε Cm.A(x)|α combines both substitutional and (in general)
objectual quantification.
Proof: We may apply the following rules (with ‘∃’ for ‘for some’):
\ (A ∧B)|α ⇔ \ (A ∧B) α ⇔§8 (\A α and \Bα) ⇔ (\A|α and \B|α)
\¬A|α ⇔ \¬Aα ⇔§8 A α rejected ⇔ A rejected in α.
\ ∃x ε Cm. A(x)|α ⇔ \ ∃x ε Cm. A(x) α
⇔ ∃ (b, β)∈Rm(x, α). \ A(bαβ) α
⇔ ∃ (b, β)∈Rm(x, α). \ A(b) αβ
⇔ ∃ (b, β)∈Rm(x, α). \ A(b)|αβ.
The remainder can be proved similarly. 
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10.2 Theorem: We may commute consecutive existential quantifiers (cf. the remark
5.1).
Proof: Let γ−β be the list of those members of γ that contain only indicators belonging
to I(γ)\ I(β), and let γ′ 
 γ−β β. Then we have I(β)∩ I(γ−β) = ∅ and hence I(αβ γ) ⊆
I(αβ γ−β) = I(αγ′). Therefore and due to the latter proof we may apply these rules:
∃x ε Cm. ∃y ε Cn. A(x, y)|α
⇔ ∃ (b, β)∈Rm(x, α). ∃y ε Cn. A(b, y) αβ
⇔ ∃ (b, β)∈Rm(x, α). ∃ (c, γ)∈Rn(y, α β). A(b, c) αβ γ−β
⇒ ∃ (c, γ′)∈Rn(y, α). ∃ (b, β) ∈Rm(x, α γ′). A(b, c) αγ′ β
. . . ⇒ ∃y ε Cn. ∃x ε Cm. A(x, y)|α. 
§11 On the Use of Hypotheses in
Cumulative Type Theory
1. Deducibility of sentences from hypotheses
considered modal-logically
This section contains only the main considerations of my TU-Darmstadt Preprint 2428.
A motivation for them is given above in the section “Hypothetical assertions” of §6.
In the previous sections we have constructed a comprehensive language of a ramified
cumulative type theory. We shall construct and investigate an extension, L, of it, which
is a language of the same sort, but also contains sentences which express that certain
sentences of L are deducible from others by given rules. To this we shall introduce ‘names’
of sentences of L and include them in L. So in L we can not only use sentences of L
but also ‘speak about’ them. (We do so though A. Tarski and others have shown that
ramified type theory can, in a certain sense, be used as a metalanguage of itself.)
We especially deal with the deducibility of sentences from ‘hypotheses’ by given axioms
and rules, and we shall show how we can formulate that deducibility in L. Assume that
A ≡ A1 ∧ . . . ∧ Aj is the conjunction of all ‘current hypotheses’. We shall introduce
sentences of the form A . B which are to mean that B is deducible from A and certain
additional axioms by certain rules. The system of those axioms and rules will be denoted
by S.
Let be given a language of type theory as described in §8. We have defined:W 
 V0∪V
andW 
W∪V. We extend the set F 
 ⋃n∈ΩFn of formulas as follows: Let F . (⊃ F)
be the set of all formulas constructible by the following six rules (where ‘⇒’ indicates
the steps of construction):
⇒ F, if F ∈ F
F ⇒ (¬F ), (∃xF ), if x ∈ W
F,G ⇒ (F ∧G), (F ∨G), (F . G).
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In the following, x, y, z range over W, x over V only, and y, z over all lists z1, . . . , zk
of variables zi ∈ W with arbitrary length k ∈ IN; t ranges over T ∪ T ; m over Ω;
F,G,H over F .; and A,B,C over A ., i.e. the set of all sentences belonging to F .. -
We let ∀y and ∀z range over all prefices of the form ∀z1 . . . ∀zk with k ≥ 0. For k = 0
let ∀z1, . . . , zk F stand for F . Note that the quantifications in ∃xF and in ∀z F are not
restricted to any order, and that formulas of F. \ F do not occur in terms of T .
Now we specify the axioms of S in A1. - A4.:
A1. Let PL be the ‘propositional language’ whose formulas are as usual composed of
‘propositional variables’ and ⊥ (
 0 = 1) by means of ∧,∨,¬, and (, ). Let TAU be
a particular finite set of tautologies that are formulated in PL. TAU with the rule of
modus ponens is assumed to be ‘complete’. As axioms of S we take all formulas ∀z F
where F results from an element of TAU by replacing all occurrences of propositional
variables with formulas of F .. Here and in the following, formulas represented by ∀z F
are permitted to contain further free variables.
By an instance of a formula, F , of F . we understand a sentence that results from F
by replacing all free occurrences of variables with values of them, which are constants.
Also the following axioms of S have the form ∀z F . Fr(t, x, F ) is to mean that t is free
for x in F , and N(y,G) is to mean that y does not occur free in G.
A2. Let all formulas of the following forms be axioms of S:
∀z (t = t) with t ∈ T ;
∀z (x = t → (F ↔ F xt )) with Fr(t, x, F ), t ∈ T , x ∈ W;
∀z (F xt → ∃x F ) with Fr(t, x, F );
∀z (∀y (F xy → H) → (∃xF → H)) with Fr(y, x, F ), N(y, (∃xF → H));
∀z (∃x ε Cm. F ↔ ∃x (x ε Cm ∧ F )) with x ∈ W, F ∈ F ;
∀z (∃x ε t. F ↔ ∃x (x ε t ∧ F )) with t ∈ T , F ∈ F ;
∀z (s ε {x ε Cm : F} ↔ s ε Cm ∧ F xs ) with Fr(s, x, F ), s ∈ T , F ∈ F ;
∀z ( (s, p) ε T (q) ↔ (s) ε Cm ∧ p < q ∧ F ((s), p, T (p)) )
with (s) ∈ T , p, q ∈ T (Ω), T ≡ (Jx ε Cm, µ, z : F (x, µ, z)), µ ∈ V(Ω), z ∈ V,
Fr((s), x, F (. . .)), and Fr(p, µ, F (. . .));
∀z (∃x ε pim((t1, . . . , tj), i). F ↔ ti ε Cm ∧ F xti),
∀z (∃x ε pim((t1, . . . , tj), p). F → p = 1 ∨ . . . ∨ p = j)
with x ∈ W; t1, . . . , tj ∈ T ; i = 1, . . . , j; p ∈ T (IN+), and F ∈ F .
A3. The following axiom schemes, which we include in S, concern the connective . :
∀z (F . F ) [1]
∀z (F . G ∧ G . H → F . H) [2]
∀z (F . ∀y (G→ H) → (F . ∀y G → F . ∀y H)) [3]
∀z (F . ∀y H → F . ∀y (G . H)) [4]
∀z ((F ∧G) . H → F . (G . H)) [5].
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Note. [3] and [4] remind of the following axiom schemes of labelled modal logic:
i (A → B) → ( i A → i B) and i A → i j A, respectively, which are in case i = j (or
without labelles i, j) usually designated by (K) and (4) (cf. (Popkorn 1994), chap. 2).
A4. As axioms of S we can (for certain purposes) also take other formulas whose instances
may be asserted due to certain rules of assertion, especially formulas of the shape ∀z (E1∧
. . . ∧ En → E) with E1, . . . , En, E ∈ E , where E1, . . . , En ⇒ E (with metavariables for
certain elements of C0 in place of variables) is an agreed rule of assertion (cf. §1).
As rules of S we take
∀z F, ∀z (F → G) ⇒ ∀z G (modus ponens)
∀z H ⇒ ∀z (G . H) (necessitation).
(Instances of these rules are F, F → G⇒ G and H ⇒ G . H. )
Let S ` B be short for “B is deducible in S (i.e. from the axioms of S by the rules
of S)”, and S(A) ` B for “B is deducible in S(A) (i.e. from A and the axioms of S by
the rules of S).” We now interprete A . B as S(A) ` B, i.e. we fix the following rule in
addition to the ‘primary rules’ quoted in §8:
\A . B :⇒ \S(A) ` B.
This rule is invertible, since we do not restrict the assertion of A .B by other rules. But
all sentences of A. are to be understood classically, i.e. with respect to the classical game
of assertion (cf. §3).
Note. We have: S ` ∀z F if and only if S ` F . This can be shown by induction on
S (i.e. on the number of corresponding deduction steps). The same also holds for S(A)
instead of S. Moreover, we have S ` ∀z (F . ∀xG → ∀x (F . G)); this reminds of the
inverse Barcan formula, i ∀xG→ ∀x i G.
11.1 Lemma: For all A ∈ A. and all F ∈ F., if S(A) ` F then S ` A . F.
Proof, by induction on S(A): Let S(A) ` F . If F is an axiom of S, then S ` A . F by
necessitation. If F ≡ A, then S ` A . F by axiom [1]. - If F ≡ ∀y H has been deduced
in S(A) by applying modus ponens from the premises ∀y G and ∀y (G → H), say, then
we may use the induction hypotheses S ` A . ∀y G and S ` A . ∀y (G → H). Then, by
axiom [3] and modus ponens, S ` A . ∀y H. - If F ≡ ∀y (G . H) has been deduced in
S(A) by necessitation from the premise ∀y H, then, by induction hypothesis, we have
S ` A . ∀y H and so, by [4] and modus ponens, S ` A . ∀y (G . H). 
Substituting B for A and S(A) for S in the latter proof, we also obtain:
11.2 Lemma: For all A,B ∈ A. and all F ∈ F., if S(A ∧B) ` F then S(A) ` B . F.
11.3 Proposition: If S ` F , then all instances of F are true (assertible).
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Proof (cf. (Smullyan 1987), chap. 26, proof of Theorem 1, e.g.): At first we show that
all instances of the axioms [1] - [4] are true. To this, we consider any instances A,B,C
of F,G,H, respectively.
Ad [1]: Let A be deducible from itself, i.e. S(A) ` A.
Ad [2]: If S(A) ` B and S(B) ` C, then S(A) ` C.
Ad [3]: Let A . ∀y (By → Cy) be a instance of F . ∀y (G→ H).
If S(A) ` ∀y (By → Cy) and S(A) ` ∀y By, then, by modus ponens, S(A) ` ∀y Cy.
Ad [4]: If S(A) ` ∀y Cy, then, by necessitation, S(A) ` ∀y (By . Cy).
Ad [5]: By 11.2, every sentence of the from [5] is true.
Also all instances of the residual axioms of S are true. Now we easily obtain 11.3 by
induction on S. To this note the following: To obtain S ` ∀z (G.H) by necessitation, we
must previously have S ` ∀z H. But then, for any instance B.C of G.H, C is deducible
in S and so in S(B) so that B .C is true. Thus every instance of ∀z (G .H) is true. 
From 11.1 and 11.3 we obtain:
11.4 Corollary: For all A,B ∈ A., S(A) ` B if and only if S ` A . B.
2. A language of cumulative type theory
with quotation marks
In the following we construct a language of cumulative type theory that contains ‘names’
of sentences. By means of first order sentences of that language we can also speak about
higher order sentences of it. Despite this ‘reduction’ of order, all sentences of that language
are non-circular.
In §8 we have defined the sets T , T and F . We say that the language L consisting
of them results from Tor, E ,V0,V,V by the T ,F-rules. Now we presuppose that a given
language L◦ results from T ◦or, E◦,V◦0 ,V,V by those rules. We shall construct extensi-
ons Tor ⊃ T ◦or, E ⊇ E◦, and V0 ⊃ V◦0 such that the language L that results from
Tor, E ,V0,V,V contains sentences expressing that S(A) ` B, for S as above and any
sentences A,B of A .. Note that L is a language of cumulative type theory.
Let VN be a denumerable set of ‘new variables’ that do not occur in the elements
of T ◦ ∪ T ◦ ∪ F◦. (N will be defined below.) Let the set Σ◦ contain all atomic symbols
occurring in elements of T ◦∪T ◦∪F◦∪VN , and the additional symbols ., N, Fr, and Sub.
Let the symbol set Σ result from Σ◦ by adding the new symbols dαe, ddαee, dddαeee, . . .,
for every α ∈ Σ◦. The symbols d, e are supposed not to belong to Σ◦. We do also not
include them in Σ. So we may consider all elements of Σ as atomic symbols.
Let Σ∗ be the set of all strings α1 . . . αj (j ≥ 0) of symbols αi ∈ Σ. So, especially, the
‘empty word’ belongs to Σ∗ (case j = 0). For α1, . . . , αj ∈ Σ (j ≥ 0) we define
dα1α2 . . . αje
 dα1edα2e . . . dαje.
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Let this figure be said to be the name of α1α2 . . . αj . Especially, d e stands for the empty
word, which is its own name. Let N be the set of all such names of elements of Σ∗.
We shall use the elements of VN as variables for (all or particular) elements of N . All
variables occurring in an element of N are considered to be bound (by the ‘quotation
marks’ d, e).
Let T (N ) be the set of all figures of the form
dS0eX11 . . . X1k1dS1eX21 . . . X2k2dS2e . . . Xj1 . . . XjkjdSje
with Si ∈ Σ∗ for 0 ≤ i ≤ j, Si 6≡ d e for 0 < i < j, variables Xik ∈ VN , j ≥ 0, and
k1, k2, . . . , kj ≥ 1.
Note. We have N ∪ VN ⊆ T (N ). If we replace all free occurrences of a variable in an element
of T (N ) by an element of T (N ) - or, especially, by the empty word -, then we again obtain an
element of T (N ).
V◦0 (⊆ T ◦or, see above) is assumed to be a set of variables (of several given sorts) for
certain constants belonging to T ◦or. Let V0 
 V◦0 ∪ VN , Tor 
 T ◦or ∪ T (N ), and let
E contain all elements of E◦, all equations (σ =0 τ) with σ, τ ∈ T (N ), and certain
further formulas, which we shall specify below. Let, as announced, T , T ,F result from
Tor, E ,V0,V,V by the T ,F-rules.
Examples of tuples containing the empty word are: ( ), (t, ), ( , ), ( , , t), for any t ∈ T . Such
tuples are particular elements of T .
Given a system S of axioms and rules as indicated above. We want to define sets
R0, R1, R2, . . . ∈ C1 such that, for all n ∈ IN, Rn is the set of all names of sentences that
are deducible in S by ≤ n steps of deduction.
For any U ⊆ Σ∗ let Ud,e be the set of all names due of elements u of U . (So we have
Ud,e ⊆ Σ∗d,e = N .) The sign ‘=0’ between elements of N is to mean their literal equality.
So long we have used the letters x, y, x, s, t,m, F,G,H, . . . as metavariables.
However, to make the following definitions easier to read, we now use these and some
other letters to indicate particular variables of VN that range over certain subsets of N .
That is, we provisionally let w (∈ VN ) range over Wd,e, x, y over Wd,e, x over Vd,e, r
over T d,e, s over T d,e, t over T d,e ∪T d,e, m over Ωd,e, F,G,H,X over F.d,e, P,Q over
Fd,e only, and η, ζ over names d∀z1 . . . ∀zke of prefices with variables zi ∈ W and length
k ≥ 0. (Of course, we presuppose that VN contains denumerably many variables of each
of those sorts.) We write d. . . xˇ - - -e for d. . .exd- - -e (wherein x occurs free), d. . . xˇFˇ -
- -e for d. . .exF d- - -e, e.g., d. . . ∀yˇ - - -e for d. . .eηd- - -e, and d∀zˇ - - -e for ζd- - -e.
The following formula ‘Axiom(X)’ of F1 can be read as “X is the name of an axiom
of S”:
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Axiom(X) 
 ∃F,G,H, P,Q,w, x, y, x, η, ζ, r, s, t,m ε C0.
(
X =0 d ∀zˇ (Fˇ . Fˇ )e
∨ X =0 d ∀zˇ (Fˇ . Gˇ ∧ Gˇ . Hˇ → Fˇ . Hˇ)e
∨ X =0 d ∀zˇ (Fˇ . ∀yˇ (Gˇ→ Hˇ)→ (Fˇ . ∀yˇ Gˇ→ Fˇ . ∀yˇ Hˇ))e
∨ X =0 d ∀zˇ (Fˇ . ∀yˇ Hˇ → Fˇ . ∀yˇ (Gˇ . Hˇ))e
∨ X =0 d ∀zˇ ((Fˇ ∧ Gˇ) . Hˇ → Fˇ . (Gˇ . Hˇ))e
∨ . . .
∨ (X =0 d ∀zˇ (Gˇ→ ∃xˇ Fˇ )e ∧ Sub(G,F, t, x) ∧ Fr(t, x, F ) )
∨ (X =0 d ∀zˇ (∀yˇ (Gˇ→ Hˇ)→ (∃xˇ Fˇ → Hˇ))e
∧ Sub(G,F, y, x) ∧ Fr(y, x, F ) ∧ N(y, d∃xˇ Fˇ → Hˇe) )
∨ X =0 d ∀zˇ (∃wˇ ε Cmˇ. Pˇ ↔ ∃wˇ (wˇ ε Cmˇ ∧ Pˇ ))e
∨ X =0 d ∀zˇ (∃xˇ ε rˇ. Pˇ ↔ ∃xˇ (xˇ ε rˇ ∧ Pˇ ))e
∨ (X =0 d ∀zˇ (sˇ ε {xˇ ε Cmˇ : Pˇ} ↔ sˇ ε Cmˇ ∧ Qˇ)e
∧ Sub(Q,P, s, x) ∧ Fr(s, x, P ) )
∨ . . . ).
(We have ommited several brackets in the definiens of Axiom(X), which is to be com-
pleted by means of names for further axioms alleged under A1, A2 and A4 (above).) Of
course, a sentence of the form Fr(t, x, F ) with names t, x, F (in place of variables) is
to mean that t′ is free for x′ in F ′ where t′ is the term denoted by t, x′ is the variable
denoted by x, and F ′ is the formula denoted by F . Similarly, N(y,G) is to mean that
y′ does not occur free in G′, and Sub(G,F, t, x) is to mean that G′ results from F ′ by
substituting t′ for x′. We include all formulas of those shapes in E . To formulate this in
more detail, we at first define: For U ⊆ Σ∗ let T (Ud,e) be the set of all elements of T (N )
whose instances are elements of Ud,e. Now let E contain all elements of E◦ and all formu-
las Fr(t, x, F ), N(y,G), and Sub(G,F, t, x) with x, y ∈ T (Wd,e); F,G ∈ T (F . d,e), and
t ∈ T (T d,e ∪ T d,e).
We now recursively define R0, R1, R2, . . . :
R0 =
{
X ε C0 : Axiom(X)
}
Rn+1 =
{
X ε C0 : X ε Rn
∨ ∃F,G, ζ ε C0. (d ∀zˇ Fˇ e ε Rn ∧ d∀zˇ (Fˇ → Gˇ)e ε Rn ∧ X =0 d ∀zˇ Gˇe)
∨ ∃G,H, ζ ε C0. (d ∀zˇ Hˇe ε Rn ∧ X =0 d ∀zˇ (Gˇ . Hˇ)e)
}
.
It is easy to see that Rn is the set of all names of sentences that are deducible in S by
≤ n steps (cf. (Zahn 1993, p. 425f.)). For any ν ∈ V(Ω), Rν can also be defined as an
element of T1 (see the proof of 8.12). Let R

⋃
ν ε INRν . So R ∈ C1, and for any B ∈ A .,
the sentence dBe ε R belongs to A1 and means that B is deducible in S. So, by 11.4,
dA . Be ε R means that B is deducible in S(A) (i.e. ‘from A in S’).
Remarks: In the above definition of R0, R1, R2, . . . it has been convenient to use variables
of several sorts, namely for every set U ∈ {W,V,W, T , T , T ∪ T ,Ω,F ,F .} variables ranging
over Ud,e, and variables ranging over names d∀z1 . . . ∀zke of prefices with zi ∈ W and k ≥ 0.
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But instead of those variables (which belong to VN ) we need only one sort of variables, namely
variables ranging over N . Then we have to reformulate Axiom(X) thus:
∃F, . . . , ζ, . . . ε C0.
(
F ε F .d,e ∧ . . . ∧ ζ ε Πd,e ∧ . . . ∧ (X =0 ζ d(Fˇ . Fˇ )e ∨ . . . )
)
whereX,F, ζ, . . . are elements of V(N ) ranging overN . Here we have added the clauses F ε F .d,e,
ζ ε Πd,e, . . ., where Π denotes the set of the above mentioned prefices. (To avoid misunderstan-
dings we can replace ‘F .’ by a new sign in this context.) We can effect that the latter clauses
are in F1 - provided that T ◦or, E◦,V◦0 ,V, and V, are recursively enumerable (i.e. constructible by
formal rules). Indeed, in this case also the sets T , T ,F ,F .,Π, . . . are recursively enumerable so
that the corresponding sets of names for elements of those sets can be introduced as elements of
C1 (namely on the model of the above introduction of R 

⋃
ν ε INRν). - However, we dispense
with complete reformulations of ‘Axiom(X)’ and the definition of Rn+1.
The predicates N(·, ·), Fr(·, ·, ·), and Sub(., ., .) have recursively enumerable extents and can,
therefore, be defined to be elements of C1. So it suffices to take E to be E◦. (Recall that, by a
demand given in §8, we have (s =0 t) ∈ F0 for all s, t ∈ T (N ).) We may also omit the signs N,
Fr, and Sub from Σ◦.
When we say that a sentence B is deducible in S(A), we do not use the sentences A and B,
we only refer to them. To indicate this fact we can put them in quotation marks. Accordingly,
it would be adequate to understand A . B as a shorthand of dAe . dBe. But then the definiens
of ‘Axiom(X)’ turns in
∃F, . . . , ζ, . . . ε C0.
(
X =0 d ∀zˇ (F . F )e ∨ . . .
)
,
where several occurrences of F are bound by d, e, which misses the intended meaning.
We do no further discuss that matter.
3. A version of the Theorem of Löb
Modifying an idea of Craig (see (Smullyan 1987), chap. 26, e.g.) we now extend F . thus:
For all F,G ∈ F . let ∆(F,G) be a formula of E (⊂ F ⊂ F .). For all A,B ∈ A . let
∆(A,B) mean that S(A) ` (∆(A,B)→ B).
(Note that the latter deducibility relation does not depend on the meaning of ∆(A,B).)
So for all F,G ∈ F ., all instances of
∀z (∆(F,G) ↔ F . (∆(F,G)→ G) )
are true. We now take all formulas of this form as additional axioms of S. (These axioms
can easily be enclosed in ‘Axiom(X)’.) So all formulas of the following form are deducible
in S:
∀z { (∆(F,G)→ G) ↔ [F . (∆(F,G)→ G)→ G]}.
Writing H for (∆(F,G)→ G) we obtain this version of the
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Diagonal Lemma: For all F,G ∈ F . there is an H ∈ F . satisfying
S ` ∀z {H ↔ (F . H → G)}.
This implies especially the following version of the
Theorem of Löb: For all B,C ∈ A ., if S ` (B . C → C), then S ` C.
The proof given in (Boolos 1989), p.187, can easily be transformed into a proof of this
version of Löb’s theorem. By another well known theorem of modal logic, this version
yields
S ` (B . (B . C → C)→ B . C),
which reminds of the modal scheme i ( i C → C)→ i C). Obviously, all results of this
section also hold for S(A) instead of S.
Notes: 1. Modal systems satisfying the latter scheme together with (K) and (4) are said to be
of type G.
2. Let > 
 ¬⊥, e.g. Because of S 6` ⊥, Löb’s theorem and 11.4 especially imply S 6` ¬ (> .⊥)
(cf. Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem).
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